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In the Matter of the Arbitration Between

THE MANAGEMENT TRUSTEES OF THE
NYSA-ILA PENSION TRUST FUND,

- and -

Pension Claim
(Anthony Scotto)

THE UNION TRUSTEES OF THE
NYSA-ILA PENSION TRUST FUND.

Arbitrator:

Appearances:

Eric J. Schmertz

Lambos & Junge
(by C. Peter Lambos and
Donate Caruso)

for Management Trustees

Stillman & Friedman, P.C
(by Julian W. Friedman and
Samantha J. Leventhal)

for Union Trustees

BakerBotts, L.L.P
(by Bertram Perkel)

for Anthony Scotto

INTRODUCTION
The New York Shipping Association, Inc. (NYSA) - International
»
Longshoremen's Association (ILA) Pension Trust Fund (PTF) is a multiemployer, labormanagement trust fund administered by three management trustees and three union
trustees. The PTF was established pursuant to an Agreement and Declaration of Trust
and Plan (Plan) and the collective bargaining agreements existing by and between
NYSA1 and ILA.
PTF administers an employee pension plan that provides retirement benefits to
industry employees and their beneficiaries. Eligible PTF participants include
longshoremen, union representatives, waterfront workers, dispatchers, employees of PTF,
other NYSA-ILA trust funds and medical centers.
The dispute submitted for arbitration concerns the number of years of credited
service Anthony Scotto should receive for purposes of fixing the amount of his pension
benefits. Scotto left union office in late 1980 and he has not worked in the industry since
1981. His efforts to secure a pension based on at least 25 years of credited service2 date
back to early 1984 when he inquired about his years of service. Management and Union
co-counsel of PTF and the Executive Secretary to PTF informed him that he had only 18
years of credited service from 1963 through 1980 and none from 1953 to 1962. PTF's
Board of Trustees met on Scotto's appeal in December 1984 and they referred the issue

1 NYSA is the multiemployer bargaining agent for the employers of longshore workers in the Port of New York and
New Jersey (NY-NJ Port).
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It is at this level that his pension increases due to the application of a "vested rights formula."

to co-counsel for review. Management co-counsel issued a written opinion in January
1985 that Scotto had no credited service from 1953 through 1962 primarily because his
employers during that time period had not made contributions to PTF on his behalf.
hi early 1999, after he turned 65 years of age, Scotto applied for pension benefits
claiming uninterrupted service from 1953 through 1980. On April 1, 1999, PTF's
Executive Director informed Scotto that a pension in the amount of $280.69 per month
had been approved, effective June 1, 1999, based upon 18 years of credited service for
the period from 1963 through 1980. No service credit was given for the years 1953
through 1962. Scotto appealed that determination to PTF's Trustees who deadlocked at a
meeting on April 7, 1999. The Management Trustees voted to deny the appeal and affirm
a benefit determination based on 18 years of credited service. The Union Trustees voted
to grant the appeal and award a pension of $700.00 per month based on at least 25 years
of credited service from 1953 through 1980.
This arbitration was instituted to resolve the deadlock pursuant to provisions of
federal law3 and Article IX, §1 of the PTF plan.
A hearing was held on March 10, 2000 in New York City at which the Trustees
and Scotto were represented by counsel. The arbitrator's oath was waived. Counsel for
the parties stipulated many facts, including Scotto's work history, and they were
permitted a full opportunity to examine witnesses. There were no objections to the

The Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA or Taft-Hartley Act) §302(C)(5)(B), 29 U.S.C.A. §186(C)(5)(B)
provides that a deadlock in the administration of an employee benefit fund must be resolved by "an impartial
umpire."
3

conduct of the hearing. A stenographic record was taken and the parties filed posthearing briefs and reply.

BACKGROUND FACTS
Scotto was credited with 18 years of service for work during 1963 through 1980.
Those years are not in dispute. Only those from 1953 through 1962 are disputed. The
parties' stipulated Scotto's employment history during the years in dispute as follows:
Year

Employment

1953

402 hours as waterfront employee

1954

1,358 hours as officer and employee of Locals
1814 and 327-1 and 67 hours on waterfront

1955

1,178 hours as Local 1814 officer and employee and
1,064 hours as employee of Welfare Fund

1956

1,579 hours as Welfare Fund employee

1957

1,447 hours as Welfare Fund employee and 1,106
hours as employee of Brooklyn Clinic
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1,538 hours as employee of Brooklyn Clinic

1959

1,714 hours as employee of Brooklyn Clinic

1960

1,644 hours as employee of Brooklyn Clinic
and 92 hours as officer and employee of
Local 1814

1961

1,616 hours as Local 1814 officer and employee and
1,616 hours as employee of Brooklyn Clinic

1962

1,589 hours as Local 1814 officer and employee and
1,589 hours as employee of Brooklyn Clinic.

Scotto's employers, whether Local 1814, Local 327-1,4 the Brooklyn Clinic or the
Welfare Fund did not report any of his earnings to PTF nor did they make pension
contributions on his behalf to the PTF for the years in issue. His union employer offered
in 1983 and 1999 to make contributions on his behalf for all years of his union
employment, but the offers were rejected by the Plan Trustees.
For certain of the years in which Scotto was an officer/employee of Local 1814, he
did not accept compensation for services rendered to Local 1814 and its membership
because the union was in economic distress and could not pay. The years for which
Scotto was not paid by Local 1814 is somewhat unclear. The documents in evidence and
the Trustees' memoranda refer to different dates.
As best as can be determined, the years for which Scotto was not paid for union
work were 1956 through and including 1959. He was also unpaid by Local 1814 in 1960,
except for $270 he received. It is not necessary, however, to identify the years of service
for which Scotto did not accept compensation for union work with any great precision.
No matter the number or the arrangement of those years, for reasons discussed hereafter,
Scotto's waiver of compensation is immaterial to his pension eligibility.
The large number of documents the parties admitted into the record by agreement
relate to the following:
1. Scotto's employment history, including hours and earnings.
2. Scotto's 1984 inquiry regarding service credit.
3. Scotto's 1999 application for benefits.
' Local 327-1 later merged into Local 1814.

4. Receipt by certain Brooklyn Clinic employees of PTF service credit for time
worked at the medical center.
5. A September 30, 1978 deadline under the PTF Plan for retroactive pension
contributions on behalf of union representatives.
6. Receipt by the PTF of retroactive pension contributions on behalf of union
employees.
7. Service credit being extended to employees notwithstanding the absence of
pension contributions or the presence of service breaks.
8. Service credit awarded to Pier Superintendents.
THE BROOKLYN CLINIC
The Brooklyn Clinic is one of the medical centers that are owned and operated by
the NYSA-ILA Medical and Clinical Services Fund (Clinic Fund). The Clinic Fund is a
jointly administered, multiemployer, labor-management trust fund existing under law,
Declaration of Trust and Plan, and collective bargaining agreements. The Clinic Fund
administers an employee welfare benefit plan that provides medical, dental and other
healthcare benefits on an out-patient, ambulatory basis to eligible plan participants and
their dependents. Scotto worked for the Brooklyn Clinic from 1957 through 1962. In
1960, the Clinic Fund created a pension plan for employees of the Brooklyn Clinic and
other medical centers known as the NYSA-ILA Medical and Clinical Services Fund
Retirement Trust (Retirement Trust). Scotto was, like other Clinic employees, a required
participant in the Retirement Trust. Scotto's employer contributed ten percent of his
straight-time salary to the Retirement Trust from 1960 until he left his employment with

the Brooklyn Clinic in 1962. At that time, Scotto withdrew the Retirement Trust
contributions. He did so on advice of Peter Lambos, counsel for the PTF Management
Trustees, who told him that he had to withdraw the monies credited on his behalf in the
Retirement Trust because he was no longer employed by the Brooklyn Clinic. The
accuracy of that information is not questioned by any party.
In 1966, persons then in the employ of the Brooklyn Clinic and the other NYSAILA medical centers were afforded the right to roll the funds that had been credited to
them under the Retirement Trust into the PTF Plan. Those employees then received PTF
service credit for all of the years they worked at the medical centers, including the years
when they were covered by the Retirement Trust, and earlier years when they were not
covered by that pension plan. That option was not extended to Scotto.
THE WELFARE FUND
The NYSA-ILA Welfare Fund (Welfare Fund), like the Clinic Fund, is a jointly
administered, multiemployer, labor-management trust fund established under law,
Declaration of Trust and Plan, and collective bargaining agreements. The Welfare Fund
administers an employee welfare benefit plan that provides hospital and medical benefits
on both a self-insured and insured basis to eligible plan participants and their dependents.
Scotto was employed by the Welfare Fund from 1955 through 1957 as a Claims
Representative and Investigator. The Welfare Fund was his sole employer in 1956. In
1955, he was also employed by Local 1814 and in 1957 he also worked for the Brooklyn
Clinic. Although Scotto worked more than 1,000 hours for the Welfare Fund during each
of those three years, no hours were reported nor were any contributions made to PTF by

the Welfare Fund. In 1958, after Scotto had left his employment with the Welfare Fund,
employees of the Welfare Fund first became eligible to participate in the PTF.
CONTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES
UNION TRUSTEES
Scotto should be credited with 28 years of service for uninterrupted work in the
industry from 1953 to 1980. Nothing under law or the PTF Plan prohibits Scotto from
receiving credit for service from 1953 through 1962. Denial of service credit for work in
the industry from 1953 to 1962 on any of the shifting and internally contradictory
rationales offered by the Management Trustees since 1984 would be incorrect, unfair and
discriminatory. The failure or inability of certain employers to make pension
contributions on Scotto's behalf is irrelevant to his eligibility for service credit.
Moreover, union offers to make pension contributions on Scotto's behalf retroactively
were made in 1983 and 1999 but refused by the Plan Trustees. Those contributions could
have and should have been accepted by the Plan notwithstanding a purported September
30, 1978 deadline for acceptance of contributions, just as they had been accepted for
other employees. Scotto would be treated in an arbitrary and capricious manner as
compared to other PTF participants and beneficiaries if he were denied credit for service
between 1953 and 1962.
The Management Trustees are barred from advancing any claims or arguments in
arbitration that were not actually submitted to and considered by the PTF Trustees at their
meeting of April 7, 1999. The bar extends to the LMRA §302 argument that is meritless
in any event.
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MANAGEMENT TRUSTEES
The PTF's plan document controls an individual's eligibility for pension benefits.
Under the clear provisions of the PTF Plan, Scotto's employment before 1963 is not and
cannot be credited service. Scotto suffered a service break5 from 1954 through 1962,
which forfeited all years of service that occurred prior to and during the service break.
No hours were reported and no contributions were paid to PTF for service before 1963.
Both are conditions to services being credited. Retroactive pension contributions may
not be accepted under the Plan and federal law. Work for the union without
compensation is not credited service. Work done as other than a full-time employee is
not credited service. PTF's treatment of other plan participants is not relevant because
Scotto is not similarly situated to the other participants. To credit Scotto with service
before 1963 would breach the Trustees' fiduciary obligations.
ANTHONY SCQTTO
Service credit should be given for work in the industry from 1953 through 1962
without requirement for retroactive contributions. Arguments not presented to the PTF
Trustees may not be considered by the arbitrator.

5 A break in service occurs whenever an employee works fewer than 400 hours a year in covered employment for
more than two years before September 30, 1978 and fewer than 501 hours a year for more than two years on and
after October 1, 1978.

Summarized below are the grounds set forth in the Management Trustees' brief in
support of their argument that none of Scotto's employment prior to 1963 is credited for
pension purposes.
Union Employment
1. Scotto did not receive a salary for the work and the offices he held with Local
1814 from 1956 through 1959. A union representative must receive a salary from the
union if the employee is to have "employment in the industry" within the meaning of the
PTF Plan.
2. No hours of work were reported and no pension contributions were made by
any union employers on Scotto's behalf for any pre-1963 union employment.
Contributions are required by the PTF Plan. The unions' failure to make contributions
cannot be cured retroactively because the PTF Plan itself establishes a September 30,
1978 cut-off date for union contributions. Retroactive contributions for union
employment would be illegal in any event under §302 of the Taft-Hartley Act.
Welfare Fund/Brooklyn Clinic Employment
1. Scotto's employment with the Welfare Fund and the Brooklyn Clinic was not
employment in the industry under the PTF Plan because he was employed by those
employers when neither employer was covered by the PTF Plan. Amendments to the
PTF Plan that enrolled Welfare Fund and Brooklyn Clinic employees into the PTF Plan
were made after Scotto left his employment with the Welfare Fund and the Brooklyn
Clinic. These amendments were not intended to be retroactive. That intent is manifest
10

from the contribution requirement, a condition that ipso facto precludes any credit for
prior service with these employers.
2. No hours were reported and no contributions were made to the PTF Plan by
either the Welfare Fund or the Brooklyn Clinic and retroactive contributions are not
expressly authorized by the Plan and are barred by §302 of the Taft-Hartley Act.
3. For some of the time during the years in dispute, Scotto worked for both the
Brooklyn Clinic and for ILA Local 1814. Therefore, he was not a full-time employee of
the Brooklyn Clinic and, as such, he was not employed in the industry within the
meaning of the PTF Plan.
4. Scotto was a participant in the Retirement Trust in 1960, 1961 and 1962 when
he worked for the Brooklyn Clinic. His participation in the Retirement Trust was a
disqualifying condition which made his employment other than within the industry.
Dock Employment
1. Scotto's work on the waterfront in 1953 is employment in the industry, but the
service break from 1954 through 1962 made his work in 1953 ineligible for service
credit.
OPINION
The Arbitrator's Role
PTF's Management and Union Trustees agree that the arbitrator serves as the
seventh, tie-breaking trustee in disputes arising under the Plan. Like any other Plan
trustee, the arbitrator, as trustee, must act reasonably and solely in the interest of the Plan
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participants and beneficiaries to ensure that eligibility determinations are reached and
applied fairly.
Although in agreement as to these general principles, the Management and Union
Trustees have a disagreement about the scope of the arbitrator's review.
The Management Trustees argue that the arbitrator's review proceeds de novo
upon an independent appraisal of the "evidence presented to the trustees." From the
Management Trustees' view, the arbitrator is allowed and required to consider any
eligibility issue or argument that can be supported by the facts in the record, even if that
issue or argument was not actually discussed or voted upon by the Plan Trustees.
The Union Trustees argue that only the issues or arguments discussed and decided
by the Plan Trustees are subject to the arbitrator's review and decision.
I agree with the Union Trustees on the scope of review. Although the record
forms the factual context in which the eligibility issues are to be decided, the review is
limited to the issues and arguments actually discussed and voted upon by the Plan
Trustees.
The arbitrator's function is to break a "deadlock." A deadlock can arise only over
issues that have been actually addressed by the Plan Trustees. There cannot be a
deadlock over issues and arguments that have not been debated and voted upon by the
trustees, even if the factual record could be said to give rise, potentially, to other issues or
arguments. There is simply no way of knowing how any of the Plan trustees may have
voted on an issue or how they would have resolved an argument if that issue or argument
has not actually been presented to them. These trustees reached a deadlock on certain
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issues only and it is only those issues which can be submitted to the arbitrator for the tiebreaking vote. If I were to decide an issue that had not been considered by the Plan
Trustees, I would not be acting as the seventh, tie-breaking trustee. Rather, I would
become the sole trustee deciding questions never considered by the Plan Trustees. That
is a role I have not been given under law or the Plan and it is not one I am allowed to
assume. The issues that are and are not properly before me are discussed below.
I also believe that I am required to follow the traditional substantive and
procedural rules that govern arbitration proceedings to the extent those rules are
consistent with my status as the seventh trustee. This dispute may be a special type of
arbitration in the sense that I function in a dual capacity as arbitrator/trustee, but it is an
arbitration proceeding nonetheless and, consistent with my status as trustee/arbitrator, I
have acted according to customary arbitration precepts.
Scotto's Credited Service
For the reasons set forth hereafter, Scotto must be credited with service from 1953
through 1962, except for 1956, and awarded a pension based on those years of service
plus the years of credited service from 1963 through 1980, which are not in dispute.
Certain basic, but important facts are not in dispute. First, all of Scotto's
employment for the years in question was exclusively in the longshore industry. Indeed,
Scotto has never worked outside that industry in his adult life. Second, Scotto worked for
each and all of the years in issue more than the number of hours that are required under
the PTF Plan to qualify an employee for service credit. Third, none of Scotto's
employment decisions were made with an intent to compromise his pension benefits. I
13

am persuaded that he was not aware and was not informed that leaving one job for
another or holding two jobs simultaneously might affect his eligibility for service credit
inPTF.
The Management Trustees denied Scotto service credit for the years 1953 through
1962 on the ground that he had a break in service from 1954 through 1962 which
disqualified him from service credit for all of those years and for his work in 1953 on the
waterfront which would have been credited to him but for the subsequent service break.
The only grounds clearly submitted for the Trustees' debate and vote in April
1999 regarding service credit were the failure by Scotto's employers to report his
earnings or hours and to make pension contributions to PTF on his behalf. These grounds
are common to both Scotto's union employment and his employment with the Welfare
Fund and the Brooklyn Clinic. There was also mention during the Trustees' 1999
meeting of his participation in the Retirement Trust. None of these is a permissible or
persuasive basis to deny Scotto service credit for the years 1953 to 1962, with the
exception of 1956, which I need not reach.
The obligation under the PTF Plan to report earnings or hours for and on behalf of
an employee rests exclusively with the employee's employer. The failure or refusal by
an employer to report hours worked or the earnings derived from that employment cannot
serve to deprive an employee of service credit and derivative pension entitlements
because the default is not in an obligation owed by the employee. Without obligation,
there is no responsibility and no consequence.
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Scotto's employers' failure to report earnings/hours is all the more appropriately
rejected as a basis for a denial of service credit for Scotto because there is no dispute
about the number of hours he worked or his earnings. The PTF Trustees know the
number of hours Scotto worked and how much he made. They also know to a certainty
that he worked more than enough hours every year from 1953 through 1962 to qualify for
service credit for those years. A failure to report hours or earnings in these circumstances
is inconsequential to the calculation of Scotto's years of credited service.
The Management Trustees' main argument, advanced consistently over many
years, has been that Scotto's employers during 1954 through 1962 did not make pension
contributions on his behalf to PTF. But like the hours/earnings reporting obligation, the
contribution obligation under the PTF Plan is a matter strictly between the Plan Trustees
and the employee's employer(s). As and to the extent contributions were not made to
PTF on Scotto's behalf by any of his employers, that noncontribution, for whatever the
reasons it occurred, does not and cannot serve to cause a forfeiture or diminution of the
pension rights Scotto would have had but for the absence of contributions. If
contributions are owed, they are owed by Scotto's employers and it is the Trustees' right
to attempt to collect them. Any alleged legal inability or failure to collect those
contributions retroactively from any of Scotto's employers, despite the offers of payment
by the ILA locals, is immaterial to Scotto's pension rights. Even assuming that the terms
of the PTF Plan and/or federal law prohibit the receipt or collection of retroactive1 pension
contributions from employers on behalf of any employee, the contribution requirement
never shifts from the employers to the employee. The employee is not accountable for
15

and may not suffer because of an employer's failure to carry out what is the employer's
duty. Noncontribution cannot work a forfeiture or diminution of an employee's pension
benefits that are earned by service, not contributions.
Although the analysis could stop here, it is appropriate to point out the
implications of a contrary conclusion. The Management Trustees' argument that
noncontribution by an employer results in a loss or diminution of pension benefits for
employees is one that is not Limited to Scotto. All employees in the industry would be
deprived of the pension benefits they had otherwise earned by their service if their
employers did not make contributions to the plan. Employees, however, would likely not
know that the contributions were not being made on their behalf. Even if they did know,
they are relatively powerless to compel their employers to make those contributions.

I

do not read either the terms or the purposes of the PTF Plan to reflect an intent to harm
faultless employees for the derelictions of their employers. Nor can I reasonably
construe the Plan in a way that would require the Trustees to make endless "corrective'
amendments to the Plan.
The Management Trustees' argument in this regard is unpersuasive for additional
reason. They concede that the failure by an employer to make pension contributions
would not ordinarily result in an employee being denied service credit under the PTF
Plan. They argue, however, that union employees and officers must be treated differently
and less beneficially than other employees by federal law. According to the Management
Trustees, §302 of the Tart-Hartley Act requires current contributions from union
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employers and bars retroactive contributions under any and all circumstances. This
argument is rejected for several reasons.
The Taft-Hartley Act §302 issue was not discussed or decided by the Plan
Trustees in conjunction with Scotto's application for benefits. That claim, therefore, is
not properly before me. Although an interpretation of Taft-Hartley Act §302 is not
strictly within my jurisdiction, I will offer a few observations about that law in response
to the Management Trustees' request that I do so.
The Taft-Hartley issue is simply not controlling. The contribution requirement is
the employer's only and the enforcement of that obligation is a matter between the
Trustees and the noncontributing employer. If contributions were not made, and if they
cannot now be collected or received, either because of the Plan's terms or federal law, the
employee's pension rights still cannot be affected.
There appears to me also to be a significant distinction between the Trustees'
receipt of retroactive contributions from a union employer which has made the
contributions on a voluntary basis, and the collection of those monies pursuant to legal
action initiated by the Plan Trustees. The latter would again appear to fall outside the
prohibitions of the federal law because the judiciary's intervention ensures that there is
no illegality or questionable conduct.
As to the meaning of Taft-Hartley Act §302, retroactive contributions on Scotto's
behalf, given the facts of this case, do not appear to fall within the range of evils •
Congress sought to address in this legislation. The law was intended to ensure that trust
funds were not tampered with or used for illicit purposes. Congress was concerned with
17

corruption of collective bargaining through bribery of union officials by employers, with
extortion by union officials, and with abuse of power due to unregulated control of
welfare funds by union officials. There is no danger of that in Scotto's case because he
has been out of the industry and out of the union service since at least 1981. Federal law
permits union officers and representatives to enjoy pension benefits on the same terms as
other employees under exceptions and provisos to that statute. I do not interpret TaftHartley Act §302 to allow pension trustees to discriminate in the extension of benefits
between one employee and another or one class and another so long as the purposes of
the federal law are otherwise satisfied.
Furthermore, I do not view the federal law to itself ban all retroactive pension
contributions by employers. That could not be the effect of the federal legislation for if it
were, the Plan could not have fixed the September 30, 1978 deadline for the receipt of
retroactive contributions from unions. Therefore, it is not the law that bans retroactive
contributions in an absolute sense. Rather, the law may ban the retroactive contributions
only because the Plan has done so by its terms. But in that regard, the record shows that
the September 30, 1978 deadline for contributions has been waived and retroactive
contributions have been accepted on behalf of union officers years after the deadline had
passed.
The exhibits introduced into the record of this proceeding provide several
examples of employees, including union employees, being credited with service by the
Plan Trustees despite their employers' failure to make pension contributions on their
behalf. Counsel for the Plan Trustees agreed to redact personally identifying information
18

from these exhibits to protect privacy interests. Although there was not express
agreement to do the same to all of the exhibits, there is no reason or need to identify any
particular individual or entity in this opinion.
These documents establish clearly that the Trustees were crediting service for
which no concurrent pension contributions were made as late as 1984 for work dating
back over various years to as early as the 1950s. The September 30, 1978 cutoff for
contributions by unions simply has not been strictly enforced because the Trustees
recognize correctly that they need to comply "with the spirit of the Plan." Employers,
including union employees have been billed for thousands of dollars of contributions
retroactively. Moreover, credit has not been conditioned on actual collection of these
billed contributions. There is recognition by the Trustees in these same documents that
the contributions may not be collectable even pursuant to legal judgment. There is,
therefore, no basis for the Management Trustees' claim that retroactive contributions are
either not authorized by the Plan or cannot be accepted after September 30, 1978.
Although the Management Trustees argue that acceptance of these contributions
was limited to a "shake out period" after the 1978 cutoff, that acceptance continued, by
the Management Trustees' admission, until the mid-1980s. That was a point in time
coincident to the date Scotto first inquired about his years of service, yet he was not
afforded the same treatment. After examining the records in evidence, it is apparent that
the Trustees have acted to prevent perceived injustice, to correct mistakes, and to protect
persons who "had no earnings attributed to employment outside the industry during that
period." Scotto's circumstances are comparable to these other individuals or, at least, not
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so dissimilar as to make the Trustees' willingness to accept retroactive contributions for
others inapplicable to Scotto.
Those same principles account for the Trustees' decisions to grant pension
benefits to employees despite actual or potential breaks in service such as was done for
the Pier Superintendents. The Pier Superintendents who elected to participate in the PTF
Plan were retroactively awarded five years of credit to avoid a service break, without
required pension contributions, because they had service in the industry and their
employers were under the mistaken belief that contributions were not required of them.
The Management Trustees argue that the treatment of the Pier Superintendents is
not relevant because Scotto was never employed in that capacity. The Management
Trustees' argument in this respect, however, misses the point. So far as the Plan is
concerned, Scotto and the Pier Superintendents were "similarly situated." That Scotto
was a union official and the Pier Superintendents were not is not a difference. Both had
the same eligibility for pension credits. Both were covered by the same Plan and both
enjoyed the same benefits.
There is significance to the treatment of the Pier Superintendents also because it
reflects an intention on the part of the Plan's administrators and Trustees to preserve,
protect and extend service credit for employees who have continuously worked in and for
the industry, notwithstanding the capacity in which they were employed. The Trustees'
actions reveal a conscious, concerted effort to guard against a forfeiture or diminution of
pension benefits. The service credit extended to Pier Superintendents is particularly
relevant because the problem was that they thought they had been covered, but learned
20

that contributions had not been made on their behalf. The actual or potential service
break was avoided for them by an amendment to the Plan that gave them years of service
credit retroactively, despite the absence of contributions. The Management Trustees'
arguments against service credit for Scotto stand out in stark contrast when compared to
the actions on behalf of these others. It is here that I apply the well-settled arbitral
principle that employees who are similarly situated must be treated similarly.
It appears from the 1985 opinion letter that the Management Trustees long ago did
not regard Scotto's participation in the Retirement Trust from 1960 to 1962 as a service
break because there was no prohibition against participation in more than one pension
plan at the relevant time and the subsequent prohibition was not retroactive. Having now
raised that ground again, it is properly rejected for that reason and others.
Scotto's participation in the Retirement Trust was involuntary, as was his
withdrawal of the monies in his account when he severed employment with the Brooklyn
Clinic in 1962. In 1966, employees of the Brooklyn Clinic were allowed to enroll in the
PTF Plan by transferring the amounts that had been credited to them in the Retirement
Trust into the PTF Plan. Scotto, of course, did not have this option because he was
required in 1962 to withdraw the monies that had been credited to him. Had he remained
in the Clinic's employ until 1966, he also could have enrolled in PTF and received credit
for all of his work for the Brooklyn Clinic. But he was denied the option that was
afforded all others due to circumstances beyond his control. If he had a choice between
leaving the contributions in the Retirement Trust or withdrawing them, and told that a
voluntary withdrawal would compromise his pension benefits, it is implausible that he
21

would have withdrawn those monies. In 1966, he then could have rolled those monies
into PTF and obtained full service credit, as did others. A forced withdrawal of
contributions may not and should not work a forfeiture of pension benefits. Clinic
employment was always intimately connected to the industry. The amendment to the
PTF Plan in 1966 to give Clinic employees full service credit in PTF for all years of
service merely formalized what was already de facto.
The Management Trustees argue, however, that the amendments to the Plan were
not intended to extend Clinic employees service credit retroactively because the condition
for that credit was the rollover of any contributions then in the Retirement Trust. This
again, however, is nothing more than a variation on the "no contributions" argument I
have previously rejected as a basis for a denial of service credit. The Plan amendments
recognized that Clinic employment is service in the industry. Scotto rendered that service
in the same circumstances as others who were credited retroactively with PTF service for
their work in the Brooklyn Clinic and other medical centers. That Scotto was not in the
active employ of the Clinic in 1966 is inconsequential. Credit under PTF for service with
the Clinic prior to 1966 was extended to persons who were employed by the Clinic in
1966. Scotto's employment ended earlier, but when rendered, his service was identical to
that for which others received credit for the same years of employment. The date Scotto
severed employment with the Clinic is, thus, a matter of circumstance, not substance.
Scotto's work with the Brooklyn Clinic must be recognized as credited service because to
do otherwise would occasion the very injustice and unfairness the Plan is designed to
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guard against. Scotto cannot be denied credit for the same service for which others were
given credit.
The other arguments made by the Management Trustees were not presented to or
considered by the Trustees when they deadlocked. Those arguments, therefore, are not
before me for vote or determination. Nonetheless, to dispel any doubt regarding Scotto's
eligibility for service credit, I will address each of them briefly.
Scotto's waiver of compensation for certain of the years he worked for the ILA
local because the union was in financial extremis and unable to pay does not mean that he
did not hold a salaried position. There was a salary tied to the position because his work
for the union before and after was paid. Scotto simply did not accept the compensation
derived from that fixed salary. In short, his job was salaried though he did not accept pay.
Moreover, his work was never regarded by his employer as "volunteer." The work for
which Scotto did not accept pay was of the same character as the work for which he was
paid, not incidental tasks typical of unpaid volunteers. Nor have the Management
Trustees established that Scotto did not receive anything of economic value for his work.
The injustice of denying Scotto service credit on this basis is also obvious. In
effect, Scotto waived the salary he would have received to help the ILA Local and its
membership cope with the dire financial conditions prevailing within the union at the
time. No fair and reasonable reading of the "salary" provisions of the PTF Plan, which
must be interpreted in the best interests of the Plan's participants and beneficiaries, can
result in Scotto being penalized for his actions in this regard.
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The Management Trustees also claim that Scotto had a service break because
when he worked for both the union and the Brooklyn Clinic, he was not a "full-time"
employee of either. But holding two jobs is not at all inconsistent with at least one or
each being full-time. "Full-time" for this purpose is marked by the number of hours of
work needed annually and cumulatively to qualify for pension eligibility. Scotto worked
for both the union and the Brooklyn Clinic well in excess of the hours needed to qualify
for service credit. He was, therefore, a full-time employee of both and certainly, at the
very least, the Brooklyn Clinic.
I believe that Gertrude Stein once observed that "a difference is a difference if it
makes a difference." Scotto's employment circumstances, different as they may be in
certain respects from other employees, make no difference in the calculation of his
service credit. The Management Trustees have tried to cause Scotto to fall outside the
literal terms of the PTF Plan and to differentiate his employment circumstances from
others whose service has been credited when the express terms of the Plan then prevailing
would have denied those employees that credit. In the final analysis, however, the Union
Trustees have the far better of the argument on the facts, the law and the equities.

To

deny Scotto the service credit that others have received in comparable circumstances is
arbitrary and discriminatory. I cannot give the Plan such an interpretation and need not
when a reasonable reading of the Plan's terms as written and as applied affords Scotto
service credit for all of the years in dispute, except for 1956, when he was employed by
the Welfare Fund only. I need not decide his eligibility for service credit for 1956. Even
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if that year were not credited, that would not constitute a service break and would not
affect the amount of his pension.

AWARD
Anthony Scotto is to be granted a pension in an amount based on 27 years of
credited service from 1953 through 1980, excluding 1956.

Dated:

/ /..

I

/Eric J. Schmertz
/
Arbitrator

'

State of New York

)
)ss:
County of New York )
I hereby affirm pursuant to CPLR 7507 that I am the individual described herein
and who executed this instrument which is my Award.

Dated:
Eric J. Schmertz

/
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OP NBW YORK
-X

JAMSS A. CAPO, JOHN W. M1LLARD,
JOSEPH CURTQ, BRIAN DCJGAN, and
ANTHONY PETRIZZO, in their capacities
as Management Trustees and Management
Alternate Trustees of NYSA-ILA
Pension Trust Fund,
Petitioners,

-v.
00 Civ. 5250 (JSM)
JOHN SOWERS, ALBERT CSRNADAS,
STEPHEN KNQTT, and FRANK SCOLLO, in
chair capacities as Union Trustees
of the NYSA-ILA Pension Trust Fund,

AMENDED OPINION
AND ORDER

Respondents,
To Vacate An Arbitration Award
Rendered Pursuant to 29 U.S. C. §
186 {c) (5) To Resolve A Deadlock
Between Petitioners and Respondents
Concerning The Application For
Additional Pension Credits Filed By
ANTHONY M. SCOTTO,
Additional Respondent

JOHN S. MARTIN, Jr., Cistrict Judge:
James A, Capo, John W, Millard, Joseph Curto, Brian Dugan,
and Anthony Petrizzo

(collectively "Petitioners" or the

"Management Trustees"), the Management Trustees of the NYSA-ILA
Pension Trust Fund ("FTP"), seek summary judgment vacating an
arbitration award (the "Award") granting Additional Respondent
Anthony M. Scotto ("Mr. Scotto") pension service credit for
twenty-seven years of service even though no contributions were
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P.003/012

Johr.

Bowers, Albert Cernadas, Stephen Knott, and Frank Scollo
(collectively "Respondents" or the "Union Trustees"}, the Union
Trustees of the PTF, cross-move for summary judgment afCxrming
the Award.

For the reasons sec forth below, Petitioners' motion

is granted and the Award is vacated.
BACKGROUND

The New York Shipping Association ("NYSA") is the multiemployer collective bargaining representative for employers of
longshore workers in the Port of New York and New Jersey ("NY-NJ
Pore").

The International Longshoremen's Association, AFL-CIO

("ILA"), a labor organization within the meaning of the Labor
Management Relations Act ("LMRA"), is the exclusive collective
bargaining representative of all longshoremen and other
waterfront workers employed by the members of NYSA and other
employers in the NY-NJ port.

PTF administers an employee pension,

benefit plan that provides retirement benefits to longshore
workars covered by NYSA-ILA collective bargaining agreements as
well as union officers and employees, including employees of
NYSA-ILA medical centers.
Mr. Scotto worked in the longshoremen's industry from 1953
through 1980, holding various positions with union locale, an
industry trust fund, an industry medical center, and as a
longshoreman.

In early 1999, Mr. Scotto applisd for pension
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In his application,, Mr. Scatto claimed that

he was entitled to a pension benefit based^ca^uniaber r upted
service in the industry from 1953 through 1980.

On April 1,

1992, PTF'a Executive Director informed Mr,. Scotto that he was
entitled, to a pension benefit, effective June 1, 1999, based or.
IS years of credited service for the period from 1963 through
1980.

This determination was apparently based on. the fact that

no contribution* had been made to the pension fund on Mr,
Scocto's behalf before 1963.

Mr. Scotto appealed this decision

to PTF's Board of Trustees and the Trustees deadlocked en the
issue.

The Union Trustees believed that Mr. Scottc deserved a

pension based on twenty-five years of credited service.

The

Management Trustees, however, believed that Mr, Scotto should foa
granted only eighteen ye«rd of credited service because no
contributions were ever paid to PTP on behalf of Mr. Scotto for
the years prior to 19S3.

In accordance with the provisions cf

LMRA Section 302{C) (5), codified at 29 U.S.C. S 166 (c) (5), the
Trustees' deadlock was referred co an impartial arbitrator for
resolution.
On July 17, 2000; Arbitrator Eric J, Schmerta (che
"Arbitrator") issued the Award, resolving the deadlock in favor
o* the Union Trustees and directing the PTF Trustees to grant Mr,
Scotto pension service credit for his years of service prior to
1353, even though no contributions were ever paid to the PTF
during those years by his employers.
3

The Management Trustees
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believe that the Award would force them to violate the LMRA's
prohibition against money payments by employers to unions and
union, officials.

The Union Trustees believs the Award falls

within the exceptions to this prohibition.
DISCUSSION
Petitioners argus chat the Award violates the LMRA.

Section

302(a) of the LMRA provides in relevant part;
It shall be unlawful for any employer cr association of
employers or any person who acts as a labor relations
• expert, adviser, or consultant to an employer or who
acts in the interest of an employer to pay, lend, or
deliver, or agree to pay, lend, or deliver, any money
or ether thing of value1. i:c any representative of any of his employ SB'S
who are employed ii* an industry a.££eotin.g commerce; or
2. to any labor organization, or any of£icsr or
employee thereof, which represents, seeks to represent,
or would, admit to membership, any of the employees of
such employer who are employed in an industry affecting
commerce.
29 U.S.C. § 136(a).

However, there are nine exceptions to this

prohibition, including the so-called "trust fund exception," or
Section 302(c)(5), of the LMRA.

The trust fund exception allows

payments to pension trust funds provided that: "the detailed
basis on which such payments are to be made is specified in a
written agre«m«nt with th* employer, and employees and employers
are equally represented in the administration o£ such fund." 29
U.S.C. § 186 (c) (5) .
The payments ordered by the Arbitrator do not fir. within che
trust fund exception because he awardad Scotto credit for periods
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of employment during which his employer did not make
contributions to the fund.

The Second Circuit has held that

" [o] nly employees and former employees of employers who are
lawfully contributing to a union pension trust fund may qualify
as beneficiaries of & Section 302 trust." Moerlia, v.
403 F.2d 110, 116 (2d Cir. 1968).

Thus in In re Typo - Publishers

Quc aide Tape Fund. 478 F.2d 374 (2d Cir. 1973), the Second
Circuit found that trust fund payments to union members who were
employed by non- contributing employers violated the LMRA based on
the express language of the statute. See id. at 375.
Respondents argue that nonetheless the Award payments are not'
prohibited because Section 502 (c) (2} of the LMRA provides a
separate exception for payments "in satisfaction of a judgment of
any court 01 a decision or sward of an arbitrator or impartial
chairman or in compromise, adjustment, settlement, or release of
any claim, complaint, grievance, or dispute in the absence of
fraud or duress." 29 U.S.C. § 186(c) (2).

In Respondents ' viev/,

rhe Award is therefore exempt from the Section 3 02 (a) prohibition
against money payments regardless of whether it fits within ths
exception for peneion trust funds.
The difficulty with Respondents' argument, however, is that
ic is inconsistent with the following statement of the Second
Circuit in International Longshoremen's Association v. Sea
Lines , Ir.c . . 326 F.2d 91S (2d. Cir. 1964) :
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whenever some other provision or Section 302 (c)
provides a more particularized exception, the
transaction muse satisfy the requirements of that ether
exception to be exempt. Thus, contributions to union
welfare funds which have been made pursuant tc . , .
an arbitration award, and might therefore be thought to
fall within the exceptions of Section 302 (c) (2), are to
be scrutinized under the standards set out in Section
302 (c) (5! .
Id. at 320.

While this language would ssem to preclude the enforcement
of any arbitration award that would result in a payment not
specifically authorized by the Act, subsequent cases suggest that
this statement should not be followed tolindly. Seacrain ciid not
involve an arbitration award but rather a settlement agreement
between an employer and a union,

In that context, the Second

Circuit was concerned that an employer and a union could get
around Che specific prohibitions of the LMAA. by characterising a
potentially improper payment as a "compromise, adjustment,
settlement, or release of any claim, complaint, grievance or
dispute" under Section 302 (c) (2) . Thus the underlying policy
concern articulated in g8afcra,i,n. was that Section 302 (c) (2) should
not be used ro nullify the prescriptive effect of the statute,

Gases subsequent to Seatrain have attempted to reconcile che
apparent conflict between the Act's prohibition of certain
payments and the provision that exempts payments made pursuant to
a court decree or an arbitration award.

The issue was most

recently addressed in this district in the thorough opinion of
6

F-816

03-13-2001

10:30am

From-

T-843

P.008/012

Judge Jones in New York Telephone Co, v.
Qf America Local 1100, NO. 99 Civ. 509, 2000 WL 1174344
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 2000), in which she observed:
Whether to affirm the Arbitrator's award is a difficult
question of law. The plain ~ext of the LMRA suggests
that Congress intended to creace nine alternative
exceptions to the prohibition of payments from
employers to unions. Taken at face value, the
September 13, 1990 Agreement appears to satisfy the
"settlement or release of claim" exception in
§ 302 (c) (2) . However, this Court is bound by the
ruling of the Second Circuit in Seatrain, which, in
order to prevent even the appearance of impropriety,
mandates that any payment made by an employer to a
union in lieu of a dues check-off must satisfy the
requirements of § 302 (c) (4) .
Id. at *3 (citations omitted),
In New York Telephone. Judge Jones refused to enforce an
arbitrator's award that was based on a stipulated record because
the arbitrator had not been asked to resolve the underlying
gusstion of whether the employer's hiring of temporary employees
violated the colleccive bargaining agreement at issue.

Rather,

the arbitrator had only been asked to resolve the quaetion of the
legality of the employer's agreement to pay the union an amount
equal to the dues it would have received had temporary employees
not been used.
As Judge Jones recognised, other cases suggest that where
the arbitrator has fully adjudicated a dispute between the
employer and union and has made a monetary award to compensate
the union for the damages iz suffered as £ result of a breach of
the collective bargaining agreement, the fact than the payment
7
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would otherwise be prohibited by the statute does not preclude
enforcement of the arbitration, award. See Washington Post v.
Washington - gaj,kj.more Newspaper Guild. Local 35, 787 F.2d 604
(D.c. cir. 1986); United steelworicers of Aim, v. u_._s. Gypsum Co..
492 F.2d 713 (5th Cir. 1974).
The above cases can be reconciled by examining Che role of
the arbitrator and the nature of the award.

In Washington Post

and United Steelworkers, the arbitrator found a violation of the
collective bargaining agreement which caused actual damage to the
union and ordered the employer to pay in damages a lump sum equal
to the dues che union would have collected had che employer j.iol;
violated the collective bargaining agreement,

As the Court

observed in Washington Post:
The rule we adopu in this case, although novel in the
sense that we have not previously addressed the
question, is straightforward and grounded in practical
reality. The Post, as the arbitrator Sound, violated
the terms of the collective bargaining agreement. The
Guild suffered as a consequence of that breach. The
arbitrator properly determined chat che Post should
compensate the Guild for that breach. We hold that
chis award was lawful under § 302 of the LMRA.

787 F.2d at 609.
In both aeacrain and Mew York Telephone there had been no
finding that the employer had breached the collective bargaining
agreement; there was simply a determination that the employer was
obligated to make a payment which the court found tc be in
violation of the LMRA.

Indeed, in New York Telephone Judge Jones

recognised that "if the Arbitrator had decided whether the

8
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Plaintiff's decision to hire temps violated ths CBA and then made
his award, Seatrain would not control." 2000 WL 1174344,

at *4.
Here as in Seatrairi and New York Telephone the payments at
isaue were not to compensate a party for a past injury arising
from the breach of a contract.

Rather, the arbitrator has

ordered the fund to make, on an ongoing basis, payment0 that are
prohibited under clear authority in thia Circuit.

As the Court

recognized in Washington Pest; "it is unquestionably the province
of the courts to say what the law is,

we need not defer to an

award which contemplates a violation of law." 78*7 F,2d at 60S.
Even, if Seat rain were not controlling or, the issues
presented hsre, it is doubtful that the award of the arbitrator
could toe aiUtetained because it was rendered in manifest disregard
of the law.

As Explained in Greenberg y ± _Bear. Sterns & Co., 220

F.3d 22 (2d- Cir. 2000} :
In order to vacate an award on these grounds, a
reviewing court must find "both that (1) the
arbitrators knew of & governing legal principle yet
refused to apply it or ignored it altogether, and (23
the law ignored by the arbitrators was well defined,
explicit, and clearly applicable to the case."
IcL at 28 (quoting DiSussa v. Dean Witter Reynolds. Inc., 121
P.3d 813, 821 (2d Cir. 1997)),
Here the Arbitrator considered hia role to be one of & "tiebreaking trustee," as required by the PTF plan. (Friedman Arf.
Ex. 1 at 13.)

Therefore, the Arbitrator followed "the

traditional substantive and procedural rules than govern
9
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arbitration proceedings [only] to the extant chose rules [
consistent with [hia] status as she seventh trustee." (Friedman
Aff, Sx. 1 at 13-.)

Furthermore, he specifically chose not to

review the Trustee dispute <3e novo because then he "would not be
acting as the seventh, tie-breaking trustee." (Friedman Aff. Ex.
1 at 13.)

Finally, the Arbitrator did not fully review the

possibility of a violation of Section 302, believing that the
issue was neither properly before him nor within hia
jurisdiction. (Freictaan, Aff. Ex, 1 at 17.)

He based the Award on

a. theory that the "contribution requirement is the employer's
only and the enforcement of that obligation is a matter between
this Trustees and th* ftOttCOntributing employer
. . . the employee's pension rights - . . cannot be affected."
(Friedman Aff. Ex. 1 at 17.)

This conclusion is against the "

weight of authority in the Second Circuit which clearly
conditions the legality of an employee's pension benefits under
Section 302 on employer contributions. So_e Mojal^ia., 403 F.2d at
116; Tvpo-Publishers, 47S F.2d at 375.
Thus the Arbitrator appears to have acted in "manifest
disregard of the law" because (1) ha choose to ignore the
provisions of Section 302, and (2) the law in this Circuit that
he ignored was well defined, explicit, and clearly applicable to
the case.
Given the strong public policy considerations underlying
the LMRA and the clear law in the Second Circuit that payments to
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an employee whose employer has not contributed to the plan are
illegal, this arbitration award can not be enforced,
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Petitioners' motion for summary
judgment vacating the Arbitration Award is granted.

Respondents

crosg-motion for euinmary judgment is denied.

SO ORDERED.
Dated:

New York, New Ycrk
March
, 2001
JOHN S. MARTIN, JR., U.S.D.J.

Copies to.!..
For Pgt3.ti_gn.er3 :

Dor.ato Caruso
Lambo* £ Junge
29 Broadway - 9th Floor
New York, NY 10006
For Respondents:
Julian w. Friedman
Stillman & Friedman, P,C.
425 Park Avenue
New York, NY 10022
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Bertram Perkel

Baker & Bores, L.L.P.
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IN THE MATTER OF THE ARBITRATION
between
OPINION AND AWARD
LOCAL 1205 I.B.T.

-andKLEET LUMBER CO. INC.
-X

The stipulated issue is:
Whether

the grievance of DEREK

BUCK

is arbitrable?
If so, whether the discharge of DEREK
BUCK was for just cause?

And if not,

what shall be the remedy?
A hearing was held in Melville, New York on December
27, 1999 at which time Mr. Buck, hereinafter referred to as the
"grievant"

and

representatives

Company appeared.

of

the

above-named

Union

and

All concerned were afforded full opportunity

to offer evidence and argument and to examine and cross-examine
witnesses.

The Arbitrator's Oath was waived.

Both sides filed a

post-hearing brief.
The grievant was discharged on July 1, 1999
Union

was

so

notified

arbitration on July 12th.

the

same

day.

The

Union

and the

filed

for

The Company contends that the grievance

challenging the discharge is not arbitrable because the Union did

not comply with the five (5) day time limit of Article 18 (b) of
the contract.

Said section reads in pertinent part:

"...The Union shall have the right to challenge
any such discharge within the five

(5) days

thereof..."
The question
was filed

to be determined

for arbitration

is not when the issue

nor whether more than five

(5) days

elapsed between the discharge and the submission of a grievance
to arbitration.
discharge.

Rather

it is when

the Union challenged

the

The contract does not require that the "challenge" be

in writing,

nor

arbitration.

that

it be

in the

form

of a

submission to

A "challenge" can take the form of verbal protests

or discussion, and that is what happened here, within the five
(5) day limitation.
The evidence establishes that on July 1st, a Union
representative told the Company president that the Union disputed
the grievant's discharge and asked the Company

to

reconsider.

Another talk between Union and Company representatives took place
right

after the July 4th weekend, at which

time, because the

Company would not reconsider the grievant's discharge, the Union
official

told

arbitration.
I
discharge

on

the

Company

that

it would

take

the

matter to

And it did so on July 12th.
find
July

that
1st

the
and

Union's

verbal

dispute

immediately following

the

of

the

July 4th

weekend constituted a "challenge" to the discharge within the

meaning

of Article

18(b) and therefore in compliance with the

five (5) day time limit.

The grievance filed for arbitration on

July 12th is therefore arbitrable.
On

the

merits,

however,

the

Union

is

wrong

in

asserting in its brief that the Company's evidentiary burden is
to prove
doubt."

the

grievant's

guilt of theft

"beyond

a reasonable

That criminal standard of proof is not applicable in an

arbitration, even where the charge parallels a crime.

I do agree

that

one,

in

such

employers
effect

cases

arbitrators,

including

this

hold

to a high standard of proof because of the serious
on

an

employee's

reputation,

job

security

and

employability by a finding of culpability and by his discharge
for such an offense.

The standard of proof, usually

applicable

is evidence that is "clear and convincing."

I have repeatedly

interpreted

must

that

to mean

that

the

evidence

be

of

such

quality and probativeness as to persuade me that the employee
committed
offense

the offense charged, and that the commission of that

justified the ultimate industrial relations penalty of

discharge.
In this case, I conclude

that the Employer has met

that burden of proof.
The grievant is charged with participating in a theft
of cedar lumber from the Company's lumber yard.

It is charged

that he was asked by a fellow employee, W.R. Hassman, Jr., to

help him remove some cedar lumber from the yard, without paying
for it; that Hassman offered the grievant $200 to do so; that the
grievant

agreed; that he placed the cedar on his truck

(along

with two legitimate deliveries) and then without complying with
Company rules requiring a delivery ticket to match the load and a
check or approval by the dispatcher, left the yard and delivered
the cedar to a location where Hassman was privately constructing
a deck on a residence.
Resolution
three

witnesses

-

of the issue turns on the credibility of
the

president, Howard Kleet.
each,

I find

no

grievant,

Hassman

and

the

Company

Upon consideration of the testimony of

reason why Messrs.

Hassman

and Kleet

would

testify falsely about, respectively, the plan and arrangements
for

the

removal

of

the cedar,

and what

took place

when

the

grievant was confronted with the charge of theft and discharged.
Put another way, it is well-settled arbitral law and meets the
clear and convincing

test that if the facts of a

culpability are established

dischargee's

by witnesses who have no reason to

"bear false witness" and where there is no evidence of animus or
a

"frame-up",

the denials

of

the employee

and his

different

version

of the events may be properly viewed as an untruthful

effort

to

discharge.

save

his

job

and

to

avoid

the

consequences

of

This well-recognized view was enunciated by the late

Harry Shulman, one of the leaders of the arbitration profession
and long-time Umpire under the UAW-Ford Motor Company contract.

He wrote that "an accused employee has an incentive for denying
the charge against him, in that he stands immediately to gain or
lose in the case," and that..."if there is no evidence of ill will
towards

the accused on the part of the accuser...the

conclusion

that the charge is true can hardly be deemed improper"
322 How Arbitration Works:

(see page

Elkouri and Elkouri).

Here Hassman, who admitted his role in the theft and
who

was

permitted

unhesitatingly
There

to resign

that

he

and

in lieu of discharge,
the

grievant

arranged

said

the

is no evidence to conclude he falsified that

Hassman was discharged, but then allowed to resign.
that

testimony

the

offer

against

of

resignation

was

the grievant, because

offered the chance to resign.

testified

testimony.

It cannot be

conditional

the

theft.

grievant

on

his

too was

I accept as truthful Hassman's

explanation of why he first said that he had shown the grievant a
delivery ticket from an earlier delivery (which the grievant and
the Union claim "tricked" the grievant into believing the order
was legitimate), and then revealed that there was no delivery
ticket at all.

I accept his statement that the first untruth was

an effort to protect the grievant from implication in the theft,
but that when it was discovered he told the grievant that he
"would not lie under oath in an arbitration."

So, I believe

Hassman's version of the transaction, namely that he asked the
grievant to help him steal the lumber; that no proper delivery
ticket supported the removal of the cedar; that the cedar was

loaded

after

the

grievant's

truck

dispatcher;

and

other,
and

legitimate material

duly

that

for

checked
the

or

cedar

was

put

authorized

the

grievant

on
by

the
the

willfully

circumvented the Company's prescribed rules regarding deliveries
from the yard.
Similarly I find no reason why Kleet would falsify his
testimony

regarding

the

meeting

at

confronted with the charge of theft.
Company

representatives

at

that

which

the

grievant

was

There is no doubt that the

meeting

made

clear

to

the

grievant that they were investigating a theft of cedar; that they
were looking into the grievant's participation in that theft and
that the grievant faced discharge.

I reject the argument that

the grievant was only charged with or thought he was charged with
a

violation

of Company

lumber from the yard.

rules regarding the

removable of the

Kleet testified that the grievant did not

admit the delivery of the cedar until pressed several times with
questions

about

it.

He

testified

that

upon

admitting

the

delivery the grievant became "remorseful," said he knew he "did
something wrong" and broke down and "cried."

I am satisfied that

those statements by the grievant and that event were admissions
of his participation in the theft.

Certainly he knew what he was

charged with when he was told he was discharged, but that if he
wished to resign instead, it would be acceptable to the Company.
Significant to me is that at this point, nor indeed at any point
in that meeting, did the grievant claim that he was innocent,

that he was "tricked" by Hassman or that he honestly believed
that the cedar delivery was legitimate.

Instead he said he

wanted

resignation

to

think

over

the

offer

of

instead

of

discharge.
The foregoing version of that meeting, testified to by
Kleet, I find credible and believable, the grievant's denials and
different version notwithstanding.
Theft is a summary dismissal offense.

The grievant's

employment record of three years showing no prior discipline is
not sufficiently lengthy or otherwise distinguished to consider
it as a mitigating factor.
The Undersigned, duly designated as Arbitrator, and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above-named
parties, makes the following AWARD:
1.

The grievance of DEREK BUCK is
arbitrable.

2.

The discharge of DEREK BUCK was
for just cause and is sustained.

Eric J. ScHmertz, Arbitrat

DATED:

February 16, 2000

STATE OF NEW YORK

)
ss:

COUNTY OF NEW YORK

)

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who executed
this instrument, which is my AWARD.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION,
ADMINISTRATOR
-X
IN THE MATTER OF THE ARBITRATION

between
OPINION AND AWARD
IUE LOCAL 301 AE

Case #113000051700
-andLOCKHEED MARTIN CORPORATION

-X

The stipulated issue is:
Did the Company violate Article V,
Section 8 of the 1998-2002 LM IUE
National Agreement in the assignment
of overtime work on August 13, 1999 to
JOHN ZELTINS and NEIL PARRENE in the
code
13711,
R-ll,
utility/worker
classification on second shift under
DAVID KOPMEYER? If so what shall the
remedy be?
A hearing was held in Schenectady, New York, on
August 8, 2000 at which time representatives of the above-named
Union and Company appeared.

All concerned were afforded full

opportunity to offer evidence
cross-examine
stenographic

witnesses.

The

and argument and to examine and
Arbitrator's

Oath

was

waived;

record of the hearing was taken and the parties

filed post-hearing briefs.
Based on the record before me I find that I need not
make a threshold determination on the merits.

I so find because

at two steps of the grievance procedure, the Company acknowledged

the meritorious nature of the Union's grievance, disputing only
the remedy sought.
In pertinent part, the Union's grievance dated
August 12, 1999 reads:
On Thursday, August 12, 1999, four utility
workers stayed over to fulfill a request for
floor preparation in the machine shop Q.A.
area.
The overtime was payed[sic] by the
tenant's overtime budget.
On Friday, August
13, 19099, the utility workers were again
short of manpower thus creating a situation
which required some of the workers
from
Thursday's overtime to be solicited to come
in early. These workers were willing to come
in early on Friday thereby putting them on
double-time.
The nightshift foreman refused
to
allow
the utility
workers
to
work.
Instead, management
went
to
the G.U.L.
workers for overtime support.
This policy
was only supposed to be implemented when the
utility worker's list was exhausted.
The utility workers have been working
understaffed for months.
They have been
covering the extra areas without complaint.
This additional strain is felt by all of KAPL
because of the insufficient time allowed to
perform
a good thorough cleaning.
The
unmanned positions should be filled without
further delay.
There should be a list of
hirees, in the "pipe line" ready for hire as
promised.
The
utility
workers
should
not
be
punished for trying to support the job even
during overtime situations.
Restitution should be made to the two
utility workers denied the opportunity to
work the overtime.
This overtime belongs to
the utility workers and they should always
have first refusal to do their work.

The Company's responses,

dated respectively August 24,

1999 read, inter alia:

SUBJECT: RESPONSE TO GRIEVANCE DATED 8/18/99,
Not Following Overtime List"
This grievance protests utilizing GUI/ s
instead of Utility Workers for overtime on
August 12, 1999 for coverage of open areas.
After reviewing the circumstances of this
event, the Company agrees that the Utility
Workers should have been asked prior to
utilizing the GUL's. This has been discussed
with the appropriate supervision. In the
future, the Utility Workers will be offered
the overtime first.
IDE CASE K-4556 - VIOLATIONS OF ARTICLE XXI
AND V, SECTION 8
It is the Company's position that
supervisors are responsible for prudent
management of overtime costs. However, in
this particular situation, it would have been
appropriate to offer the same options to all
utility workers before offering the work
outside the overtime group even though the
two employees in question were offered and
turned down the opportunity to work over four
hours.
It is not the Company's practice to pay
for time not worked.

It is clear to me that Manager Chmielewski and Labor
Negotiator Krueger had authority on behalf of the Company to
officially respond to the grievance and to bind the Company to
these responses.

Equally clear is that those responses admitted, on
behalf of the Company, that the Company had violated Article V,
Section 8 of the National Agreement and that the Union's
grievance in behalf of grievant's ZELTINS and PARRENE was
substantively meritorious.
I am convinced that the only reason the grievance was
not fully resolved in the grievance procedure and subsequently
submitted to arbitration, was because the Company refused to make
the grievanfs monetarily whole for the overtime they lost when
not offered the overtime opportunity.
I am not persuaded that the Company's arguments in the
arbitration that overtime was apportioned equally as required by
the contract or that the Company was not obligated to offer the
overtime to the grievants when it meant double-time pay for them,
were raised in the grievance procedure or should now be treated
as substantive defenses to the Company's admissions in its
responses to the grievance.
Rather, I hold that the Company was and is bound to its
acknowledgements made in the grievance procedure, leaving open
for arbitral determination only the matter of remedy.
The Company's position on remedy is:
"It is not the Company's practice to pay for
time not worked," and
"In the future the Utility Workers will be
offered the overtime first."

The Company's position and "practice" notwithstanding,
it is universally well-settled that employees who have lost an
earning opportunity because of an employer's breach of contract
are entitled to a monetary remedy equivalent to the earnings
lost, irrespective of the fact that they did not work the time
involved.

Otherwise, contracts could be breached with impunity

and enforcement of bilaterally bargained conditions of employment
would be frustrated.

This remedial action is applied and ordered

by arbitrators traditionally and universally, and is applicable
in this case as well.

Also, I have that remedial power stemming

from the stipulated issue, which explicitly vests the arbitrator
with the power to fashion a remedy if a contract breach is found.
Lest the Employer think this decision is solely based
on the technical Company's responses in the grievance procedure,
I have two observations.

The first is that in sound industrial

relations that is precisely the role of the grievance procedure
—

namely to set forth the positions of the parties, officially

and contractually, and to resolve disputes where possible.

And

secondly, had I judged the merits of the grievance de novo, I
would have reached the same decision.

The contract does not

provide an exception to the overtime procedure just because the
overtime may result in double-time pay.

Moreover, the decision

to work overtime is a managerial prerogative, so the Company can
schedule to avoid double-time to preclude the "manipulation" it

ascribes to the grievants.

But, if, as here, the Company re-

contours the overtime by scheduling it as a "call-in" or "preshift," because it cannot get employees to accept the overtime
"after-shift," the re-contoured schedule is a new and different
overtime assignment and the rules and procedures for its offer to
employees obtain anew.

And, as here, employees who would

otherwise be eligible to be asked first, cannot be by passed in
favor of a differently classified group just because they had
worked an earlier and different overtime assignment.

So, on the

merits, irrespective of the Company's binding admissions or
acknowledgements in the grievance procedure, I would have found a
contract breach when the Company gave pre-shift overtime to
General Utility Laborers without offering it to the grievants in
the Utility Worker-Maintenance and Service Classification.
The Undersigned duly designated as the Arbitrator, and
having duly heard the proofs and allegation of the above-named
parties, makes the following AWARD:
The Company violated Article V, Section 8 of
the 1998-2002 LM IUE National Agreement in
the assignment of overtime work on August 13,
1999 to JOHN ZELTINS and NEIL PARRENE in the
Code 13711 R-ll Utility/Workers
Classification on second shift under DAVID
KOPMEYER.

The grlevants, JOHN ZELTINS and NEIL PARRENE
shall be paid by the Company an amount of
wages equal to what they would have earned by
the assignment of overtime on August 13,
1999.

Eric J. Schmertz, Arbitrator

DATED:

October 30, 2000

STATE OF NEW YORK
COUNTY OF NEW YORK

)
ss:
)

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who executed
this instrument, which is my AWARD.

NEW YORK STATE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS
BOARD, ADMINISTRATOR

IN THE MATTER OF THE ARBITRATION
between
OPINION AND AWARD
LOCAL 202 I.B.T.
Case No. 20088

-andNICK PENACHIO CO., INC.

-X

The stipulated issue is:
Was
there
just
cause
for
the
discharge on January 21, 2000 of
EDWIN BATISTA?
If not, what shall be
the remedy?
A hearing was held on May 22, 2000 at the office of the
Undersigned at which time Mr. Batista, hereinafter referred to as
the "grievant" and representatives of the above-named Union and
Company appeared.

All concerned were afforded full opportunity

to offer evidence and argument and to examine and cross-examine
witnesses.

The Arbitrator's Oath was waived.
The parties agree that the

evaluation

Company

may

review, for

and disciplinary purposes, an employee's work record

over an 18-month period.
The Company asserts that such a review, applied to the
grievant,
record,

shows

an

excessive unexcused

absentee

and

lateness

and an excessive sick leave record, culminating

in an

"insubordinate" refusal in his part on January 17, 2000 to comply

with the instructions of a supervisor.
the

absence,

lateness

and

sick

The Company argues that

record

and

the

act

of

insubordination, separately and jointly, against the backdrop of
several

"correction

notices"

(i.e. warnings),

constitute

just

cause for his discharge.
Based on the record before me, I conclude that what
prompted

the

discharge,

review

and

triggered

the

grievant's

were the events of January 14th through

specifically,
absence

18-month

the matters of the bonafides

of

17th.

the

grievant's

from his shift beginning the night of January

continuing

to the morning

of January

14th, and

insubordination arising out of the Companyxs
that absence.

More

the

13th and

charge of

investigation of

Indeed, it is apparent to me that but

for the

grievant's absence on January 13th and 14th, and his alleged insubordination,

the 18-month review would not have been done (at

least not then) and he would not have been fired
then) .

So, the issue of just cause turns

(at least not

on his

absence of

January 13th and 14th and the charge of insubordination.
grievant

was

discharge,

not

at

fault with

regard

to

those

If the

events,

his

which would not have otherwise taken place at that

time, cannot be sustained.
I do not
January

13th through

uphold the discharge.

find sufficient
17th

fault with his

to have triggered

the

actions of

review

or to

First, with regard to the change of
the probative
Company

evidence

asserts

is conflicting

that upon

reporting

and

insubordination,

inconclusive.

to work

on

January

The
17th,

following his absence of January 13th and 14th, the grievant was
told by supervisor Ortiz that he could not punch in and that he
was to await the arrival of Mr. James Bidetti so that the matter
of

his

claims

absence
the

could

Company,

be

discussed

the

and

grievant

determined.

willfully

Instead,

ignored

the

instruction, and went home.
The
different.

grievant's

version

of

the

event

is

critically

He testified that Ortiz told him that he couldn't

punch in, and that he couldn' t work until he came in with the
Union delegate.
allowed

And, upon being pressed by the grievant to be

to work, Ortiz told him to "go home."

The grievant's

version of the event is substantially supported by the testimony
of the Union shop steward, Flores, who was present.
Significant to my mind is the testimony of Ortiz.
After telling the grievant that he couldn't punch in or work and
to wait for Bidetti, the grievant replied "let me punch in or
send me home." And to that, Ortiz said I can't let you punch in,
do what you want to do" (emphasis added).

Ortiz' testimony did

not include an unequivocal order that the grievant wait for
Bidetti, nor, when the grievant was leaving, a warning that to do
so would be defiance of an order and insubordination.

Moreover,

with Ortiz' refusal to permit the grievant to punch in, together
with Flores' testimony, not denied by the Company, that Bidetti
told Flores that the grievant was "suspended," and that Flores so
told the grievant, I conclude that the grievant had reasonable
grounds to believe that he was "off the clock" and "suspended."
If that was his belief, which I conclude to be reasonably based,
the grievant was under no requirement to wait on the Company
premises for Bidetti's arrival.

In short, the status of

"suspension" and an order to remain for a meeting are mutually
inconsistent.
In

any

event,

I

do

not

see

the

elements

of

insubordination. In sum, the grievant, I conclude, had reasonable
grounds to believe that he could or should go home in the face of
a prohibition

on working,

and/or he had a reasonable basis to

believe that he had been suspended, and therefore relieved of any
duty to remain on the premises.

I see no order to him to remain,

or a requisite warning that a failure to do so would be deemed
insubordinate.
With regard to the grievant's absence on January 13th
and 14th, the evidence on its alleged lack of bonafides, is also
inconclusive.
The Company claims that the grievant called in to say
that his wife was ill and that he had to baby sit his children.

The grievant testified that he had a foot injury or ailment
(unrelated to his chronic gout) and was instructed by his doctor
to stay off his feet for a couple of days.

Understandably

suspicious, because the absence was the day before a contract
holiday, and also because the Company thought it may have been
related to his chronic gout condition, requiring in both
instances medical substantiation and a release before returning
to work, the Company sought to investigate the absence.

But any

such investigation was superceded and preempted by the events of
January 17th, and the charge of insubordination.

The Company did

not, as it had the right to do, ask and require the grievant to
produce medical documentation for that absence.

So, its real

cause remained undetermined.
Also, with the new calendar year of 2000, the grievant
became eligible for six sick days with pay.

This is not to say

that with the start of a New Year, he is immune from an overall
record of excessive absenteeism retroactive 18 months.
is to

say that standing alone, without probative

Rather it

evidence of

falsification of his reasons for being absent, and preempted by
the

charge

of insubordination,

the absence was

trigger the discharge action in this case.

not

enough to

In other words, the

charge of insubordination stopped the investigation of the
absence short of any determination of bonafides or lack thereof.
And it was the insubordination charge, not the circumstances

surrounding
the

the absence of January 13th and 14th that triggered

grievant's discharge.

Indeed, the record

shows

that the

grievant was paid sick pay for that absence, indicating that it
was not the reason for his discharge.
insubordination,

and

by

the

But for the charge of

Company's

own

testimony,

the

grievant's absence on January 13th and 14th could and might have
been

resolved

without

meeting with Bidetti.
was

the

intervening

disciplinary

action had

there been the

So again, the charge of
circumstance

of

and

insubordination

trigger

for

the

discharge.
As to remedy, though I shall order reinstatement, I do
not find the grievant eligible for back pay.
He has suffered from an apparent
gout.

severe and

Most of his absences are from that condition.

chronic

Though on

new medication, I am not satisfied that he would have been able
to

work

during

the

period

since

his

discharge.

Under

that

circumstance, what pay he would have earned is too speculative to
be

awarded.

Moreover, he acknowledged

since his dismissal.
employment

that he hasn't worked

There is no evidence that he tried to get

to mitigate damages.

Both for his failure to do so

and because it may also mean that he has not been physically able
to work, the claim for back pay is denied.

The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator, and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above-named
parties, makes the following AWARD:
The discharge of EDWIN BATISTA was
not for just cause. He shall be
reinstated, but without back pay.

Eric J-. Schmertz, Arbitrator

DATED:

May 30, 2000

STATE OF NEW YORK

)
ss:

COUNTY OF NEW YORK

)

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who executed
this instrument, which is my AWARD.

IMPARTIAL CHAIRMAN LOCAL 100 TRANSPORT
WORKERS AND NEW YORK BUS SERVICES

IN THE MATTER OF THE ARBITRATION

between
OPINION AND AWARD
LOCAL 100, TRANSPORT WORKERS UNION
OF AMERICA
-and-

NEW YORK BUS SERVICE
V"

The stipulated issue is:
Whether the discharge of BRIDGET COOLEY is
arbitrable?
A hearing was held on December 14, 2000 at which time
Ms. Cooley, hereinafter referred to as the grievant, and
representatives of the above-named Union and Employer appeared.
All concerned were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and
argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.
The Employer asserts that the most recent discharge of
the grievant is not arbitrable because she was a probationary
employee for the period September 2000 through June 30, 2001,
pursuant to my Consent Award of June 20, 2000 and therefore
subject to dismissal without challenge during that period.

The

discharge, which the Union protests in this proceeding, took place
in September 2000.

The Union asserts that the September 2000 discharge was
for a specific reason, namely the grievant's failure to respond to
and/or pay a parking ticket she received while operating her bus,
which was subsumed in, covered by and disposed of by my earlier
Consent Award of June 20th.

In other words, the Union contends

that the resolution of the grievant's earlier dismissal, reflected
in the Consent Award involved a resolution by the parties (per my
recommendation) of all the then outstanding charges against the
grievant, including a charge relating to the parking ticket.

And

that therefore that charge was wiped out by the agreement to
change the grievant's earlier discharge to a suspension and to
restore her to duty on September I, 2000.

To now discharge her

for the traffic ticket, asserts the Union, is a "double jeopardy"
violation of the Consent Award.
The Union would be correct if the parking ticket was
considered and vitiated by the Consent Award.
But the evidence persuades me that the matter of the
parking ticket was not included as an issue or considered and
disposed of by the Consent Award.

The discharge leading to the

Consent Award was for other alleged offenses.

Though the parking

ticket was discussed during the grievance procedure, it did not
come up until a subsequent step of that procedure (following the
grievant's discharge) and then only as to the procedure the
grievant was to follow to handle it.

Based on the testimony

adduced, the parking ticket was not only not a reason for the
grievant's then discharge, but it had not became an adversary

issue at that point, and therefore was not substantively
considered or included in the agreement to reduce the grievant's
then discharge to a disciplinary suspension, as recited in the
Consent Award.
I am satisfied, by the evidence and testimony, that if
the parking ticket matter became an issue for discipline, it did
not so become until September 2000, after the grievant returned to
work under the Consent Award as a probationary employee.

As such,

it is an issue not covered or resolved by the Consent Award.

That

being so, I find no breach of the Consent Award by action based on
the parking ticket, taken by the Employer in September 2000, if
such action was taken.
Accordingly, the discharge of the grievant in September
2000, while she was a probationary employee is not arbitrable.
The Undersigned, Impartial Chairman under the collective
bargaining agreement between the above-named parties, and having
duly heard the proofs and allegations of said parties, makes the
following AWARD:
The discharge of BRIDGET COOLEY is not
arbitrable.
/^
Eric J/Schmertz
Impartial Chairman
DATED: January 17, 2001
STATE OF NEW YORK
)
ss:
COUNTY OF NEW YORK )

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Impartial Chairman that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

With this decision, I think it appropriate to make a
professional observation.
I have been informed that the leadership of Local 100
has changed by election and that new counsel will be representing
Local 100 in future proceedings before me.

That, of course, is in

the normal nature of changes in Union officership, and I extend my
welcome to new counsel to the forum of the impartial chairmanship.
That said, I do want to pay professional
retiring

counsel,

Edward

J.

Groarke,

Esq.

of

tribute to

the

law

firm,

Colleran, O'Hara & Mills, for his many years of outstanding and
eloquent advocacy on behalf of Local 100 and the grievances of its
members.

Win or lose, Mr. Groarke has always tried cases with

uncommon skill, dedication, tenacity and civility.
including

this

comprehensively

instant

matter,

and

persuasive

as

Mr.

Groarke
as

the

In every case,

presented
facts

and

a

case

contract

permit, making all the arguments available to the circumstances.
If, as in this case, the decision went against the Union, it was
because I viewed the facts and the controlling contract language
differently from that advanced by Mr. Groarke.

But in doing so, I

never doubted his sincere belief in the cause he was defending and
I admired with utmost respect his extraordinary ability and the
competence of his presentations.

Local 100 was well served by his

counsel.

^uJ~Eric \j. Schmertz
Impartial Chairman

//

OFFICE OF THE IMPARTIAL CHAIRMAN
-X

IN THE MATTER OF THE ARBITRATION
between
OPINION AND AWARD
LOCAL 100 TRANSPORT WORKERS UNION
OF AMERICA

-andNEW YORK BUS SERVICE
-X

The stipulated issue is:
Did the Employer violate the contract
by
failing
to
provide
fare-box
training for STEPHEN MONTEMURRO?
If so, assuming that on a day between
May 3, 1999 and May 17, 1999 he was
denied a tripper because he was not
fare-box trained, what remedy, if any,
is he entitled to?
A hearing was held on February 29, 2000 at which time
Mr.

Montemurro,

hereinafter

representatives

referred

to

as

the

"grievant"

of the above-named Union and Employer

and

appeared.

All concerned were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and
argument

and

to

examine

and

cross-examine

witnesses.

The

Arbitrator's Oath was waived.
Sometime between May

3rd and May

17th,

the Employer's

dispatcher announced by radio that a tripper run was available.
The grievant, then a school bus driver, applied for that tripper,
as "extra
agreement.

work"

under

Section

16 of the

collective bargaining

His application was denied on the grounds that he was

not "fare-box trained.1
The Union argues alternatively.
contract

conditions

"extra

work"

solely

It asserts that the
on "strict

seniority";

that the grievant had the requisite seniority and that fare-box
training
work.

is not a part of the contractual

eligibility

for the

It also argues that the grievant should have been fare-box

trained by that time, pursuant to a "fare box agreement"
which

all

drivers

were

to be

fare-box

trained,

and

under

that

the

grievant's prior efforts to obtain that training were improperly
denied.
As a remedy, the Union seeks an order directing that the
grievant

be

fare-box

trained

and

paid

for

3^ hours

for that

training, and also paid for the time he would have driven the
tripper.
The Employer denies any "fare-box
which

called

for

fare-box

training

of

all

training agreement"
its

drivers.

The

Employer states that the agreement with the Union was to pay 3^
hours pay

to those drivers who were

fare-box

trained

(for the

period of the training) and to fare box train not all its drivers
but only those who drove, or gave notice of an intent to pick work
requiring the use of a fare box, namely and limited to express run
operators, tripper drivers or as spare operators.

As the grievant

was a school bus operator, not having picked an express run, a

The tripper utilized a fare box to collect fares in that run,
including the use of a metrocard.

1

tripper or a spare operator under Section 18 of the contract, he
was not fare-box trained and not eligible for that training.
Section 16 and 18 of the contract read:
Section 16. Extra Work (Bus Operators)
All bus operator's extra work, including
specials and charters shall be picked by
strict seniority.
Section 18.

Pick Period

All runs will be posted one (1) week prior to
the start of the pick.
All runs are to be picked three (3) times a
year in February, June and August. With the
exception of the June pick, employees at Pick
Time must pick at least twenty-five (25) paid
hours per week, if work is available.
There appears to be no dispute that the tripper in this
case was "extra work" within the meaning of Section 16.

And,

apparently, also, had the grievant been fare box qualified, he
would have been eligible for the assignment on the day involved,
regardless of the Pick procedures and the Pick periods of Section
18.

As those assumptions appear not to be in dispute in this

case, I need not consider or resolve any disagreements with those
assumptions.
Instead, the issue narrows to whether there was a "fare
box agreement" under which all drivers would be fare-box trained,
whether the grievant's prior effort to obtain the training was
improperly denied, and if so, whether his rejection for the
tripper run because he was not fare-box trained was based on and
compounded by that impropriety.

Also at issue, at the threshold,

is whether Section 16 accords the grievant the right to the

tripper assignment based "strictly in (his) seniority," regardless
of his lack of fare-box training.
I deal with the "threshold" question first.

I am

satisfied that an implicit condition of an award of "extra work"
is that the applicant be qualified to perform it.

Manifestly, in

my view, an employee unqualified to perform any work assignment
(including "extra work") is not contractually entitled to the
work, even if he enjoys top seniority.

Especially so in my view

when, as here, the work is transportation for the public.

So, I

am satisfied that Section 16 includes as a condition (albeit
implied, but compellingly logical), ability or qualification to
perform the work, along with the requisite seniority.

So, because

he was not fare-box trained, he lacked the required qualifications
for the tripper run that day, his top seniority notwithstanding.
The questions, therefore, narrows further to whether the
Employer had erred in not according the grievant fare-box training
earlier, and if so whether the Employer is consequently monetarily
liable for not so training the grievant and for his loss of the
tripper assignment.
Part of the answer lies in a determination of the
differing positions of the parties regarding a "fare box
agreement."

The burden is on the Union to establish the existence

of such an agreement, particularly because of its costliness to
the Employer and because of its speculative applicability to
school bus drivers who do not operate express runs, trippers, or
spares, (where the fare box is used).

4

The burden has not been met.
not reduced to writing.

The alleged agreement was

The testimony by Union and Employer

witnesses is contrary to each other and hence indeterminative.
The Employer's explanation and testimony that the "agreement" was
limited to paying 3^ hours of pay to those drivers who had been
fare-box trained and that that prior training and all future
training would be limited and paid to drivers who pick express,
tripper or spare work is as persuasive as the Union's assertions
to the contrary.

Hence, I cannot find a binding agreement under

which the Employer promised to fare box train all its drivers.
And the practice over the last several years, as a managerial
prerogative, supports that conclusion.
However, there have been some exceptions to the practice
which I find to be of sufficient quantity and circumstance as to
be probative for this case.

In addition to fare-box training of

express, tripper and spare operators, the Employer also trained
some eight driver's who did not actually pick any of those three
types of work, but because and on the strength of their expressed
plan to pick such work.2

In other words, and logically, because

the Employer thought and expected that those drivers would pick
work requiring fare-box training, the training was given
anticipatorily.

Robert Velasquez, Richard P. Ortiz, Maria Marquez, Ismael
Adomo, Estevar Conde, Salvatore Fusco and Robert Grizzaffi each
advised the Employer of an intention to pick and express run,
tripper or spare operator, but picked instead MIU or school bus

I find the grievant's status at the time he responded to
the Employer's solicitation for a driver for the tripper, to be
substantially similar to that of the foregoing eight employees.
He, like they had the requisite seniority to exercise a
preferred pick, or in this case, to claim the available extra
work.

He, like they could not perform the work without fare-box

training.
was not.

They were trained in anticipation of their picks.

He

The difference, of course, is that there was time for

the eight to be trained in the expectation of their picks, but no
time for the grievant to be trained for the imminent tripper run.
But, that difference obtains to and negates only the Union's claim
for pay for the tripper run denied, not to the matter of fare-box
training.
As to the latter, I find a sufficient similarity with
eight drivers who were trained but did not pick fare-box work to
require the training of the grievant.

He tried to "pick" the

tripper work for which the Employer sought volunteers.
comparable to the stated intentions of the eight.

That was

And it

represents enough interest and intent to seek or pick tripper work
to entitle the grievant, like the eight others, to fare-box
training for the future.

Therefore, on the well-settled basis

that employees similarly situated are to be treated equally or
evenhandedly, I find that the grievant's specific interest in the
tripper run, together with his seniority, put him in a position

runs .

comparable to the other eight drivers who were trained because of
their expressed intentions.
Accordingly, based entirely on the special facts of this
case and the special circumstances surrounding the grievant's
request for the tripper "extra work," the Employer's denial of his
request was not improper, but he is now entitled to be fare-box
trained and paid 3^ hours pay for that training.
The Undersigned, Impartial Chairman under the collective
bargaining agreement between the above-named parties, and having
duly heard the proofs and allegations of said parties, makes the
following AWARD:
The claim of STEPHEN MONTEMURRO

for pay for

the tripper run denied him some time between
May 3rd and May 17th, 1999, is denied.
However, when he volunteered
that

tripper

solicitation
his

run
by

seniority,

in

the
he

for and sought

response

to

Employer,

expressed

and

an

a

general
based

on

interest

in

and a desire to operate a tripper.

That made

him eligible for fare-box training for future
tripper, express or spare work to which his
seniority
the

would

fare-box

entitle

training

him,

comparable

accorded

eight

to

other

identified drivers.
He

shall

be

fare-box

trained

hours of pay for that training.
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and

paid

31-!

This decision, based on the particular facts
and • circumstances

of

this

case,

cannot

be

construed as precedent for any other matter.
Other matters viewed similarly must be dealt
with and tried de novo.

Eric J. Schmertz
Impartial Chairman

DATED:

April 21, 2000

STATE OF NEW YORK

)

COUNTY OF NEW YORK

)

ss :

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Impartial Chairman that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.
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New York Times
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INTRODUCTION
The Guild and the Times have a collective bargaining agreement covering 19932000. In April 1994, as negotiations for that contract were nearing an end, the parties
agreed to place several job titles on a "60-Day List" for classification review. One of the
titles on the April 1994 60-Day List is News Assistant (4 Sports and 1 T.V.). When the
parties could not agree upon the reclassification of the News Assistant position from
Group 7 to a wage group higher on the contractual pay scale, the dispute was submitted to
arbitration pursuant to Article III (Salaries), Section 8 of the contract and the parties' past
practice.
This arbitration involves five News Assistants.1 Four2 of these News Assistants
now work or at one time worked in the Sports Department on the agate pages and are
sometimes called "agateers." The agate pages are ones containing mostly statistical
sports information presented in columnar format such as box scores and league standings
printed in type smaller than that normally used in the newspaper. The other News
Assistant in issue3 works on the television, radio and local event listings appearing on the
sports agate pages.
The Undersigned was selected as the arbitrator under the procedures of the

'There are News Assistants employed in other of the Company's departments, but those
employees are not in issue in this proceeding.
2Joseph

Brescia, Grant Glickson, Julius Green and Vincent Mallozzi. The employment
circumstances of these individuals changed over the course of the hearing. As last shown by this
record, Glickson took a leave of absence to work for the Guild, Brescia works two days, Green
three days and Mallozzi works only one day.
3Leslie

Chambliss.

American Arbitration Association. Hearings were held in New York City on December
12, 1996; November 4 and December 21, 1998; January 26, March 12, March 19 and
May 11, 1999. The parties were represented at those hearings by counsel who were
afforded the opportunity to call and examine witnesses and to introduce documentary
evidence. The Arbitrator's Oath was waived. A stenographic record of the hearings was
taken. Counsel have submitted post-hearing and reply memoranda.
ISSUE
Although the meaning and scope of the following is in dispute, the parties agreed
at the start of the hearing to this issue:
Should the News Assistants working in the sports department
and television section be reclassified? If so, what classification?
The Company claims that it agreed to this issue only after the Guild clarified on
the record that it was seeking a reclassification of the News Assistants to Group 10
specifically. Therefore, the Company argues that only an upgrade to Group 10 is
presented for arbitration. The Guild claims that an upgrade to either Group 8 or 9 was
preserved for my consideration if an upgrade to Group 10 was held to be inappropriate.
I accept the Guild's characterization of the scope of the issue. Although the
parties disagree about the type and the amount of evidence needed to support a
reclassification of the News Assistants to Group 8 or 9, a reclassification to Group 8 or 9
was an issue I was to consider if a reclassification to Group 10 was denied. The Guild
clearly stated on the record a request for a reclassification to Group 8 or 9 and it did not
abandon this as an alternative to a Group 10 reclassification. Moreover, a request for this

type of alternative relief is not unusual under these parties' reclassification disputes.
Therefore, I have considered first whether the News Assistant position should be
reclassified to Group 10 and, if not, whether reclassification to Group 9 or 8 is
appropriate.
APPLICABLE CONTRACT PROVISIONS
Article III. Section 8
The classification of each position provided for in Section 1
of this Article reflects the Agreements arrived at by the Job
Evaluation Committees representing the Times and the Guild.
The Times shall supply the Guild with a description of the
duties, responsibilities, proposed classification, and effective
date of a new job, and changes in the duties and
responsibilities of an existing job. The Evaluation
Committees shall meet on a regular basis to negotiate such
changes. Any disputes over the proper classification of those
changes shall be subject to arbitration.
Article IX
Multiple and Temporary Classifications
1. 50 Percent in Higher Classification
An employee who, 50 percent or more of his or her regular
working time, is assigned to and does the work that
distinguishes a higher job classification from his or her own
or who fully replaces another employee in a higher job
classification shall be reclassified and promoted under Article
VIII Section 6.
2. Two Hours or More in Higher Classification
An employee who temporarily during his or her regular
working time, is assigned to and does the work that
distinguishes a higher job classification from his or her own

or who fully replaces another employee in a higher job
classification for two or more hours in a day, shall be paid as
set forth in Article VIII Section 6 and accumulate experience
in the higher classification as if he or she had worked his or
her entire regular shift in the higher classification. Such
payment shall be made on the basis of a classification claim
slip or a temporary reclassification, whichever is appropriate.
In addition, he shall accumulate experience in the lower
classification at the normal rate.
BACKGROUND FACTS
According to their practice, the parties in 1948 agreed through a Job Evaluation
Committee to the job description for the title of News Assistant. They also agreed to
assign that position to Wage Group 7 that includes the following titles:
Administrative Secretary, Advertising Rebate Clerk, Art
Assistant, Billing Control Clerk, Cashier Receipts Clerk,
Display Charge Clerk, EDP Control Clerk, Purchasing
Assistant, Inhouse Printing Technician, Maintenance
Scheduling Sup., Morgue Indexer, Morgue Picture Indexer,
News Assistant, Newsprint and Ink Costs Clerk, Payroll
Deduction Control Clerk, Photostat Operator, Promotion Art
Assistant, Promotion Assistant, Research/Media Services
Assistant, Telephone Solicitor, Transient Adjuster.
The job description for News Assistant provides as follows in relevant part:
(Reporting, rewriting and copyreadirig shall not be a
requirement of the work of news assistant, although any
employee so classified may be permitted to perform such
work in limited amount for which no additional compensation
shall be granted, and such reporting, rewriting or copyreading
as he is permitted to perform shall be restricted to that
particular field or area of work to which he is assigned as a
news assistant. Furthermore, the amount of reporting,
rewriting or copyreading permitted to a news assistant
without additional compensation shall result in publication of

no more than an average of three columns of such work per month.)
Perform as assigned any of the following work:
Compiling - Gather and prepare accurately and rapidly for
immediate publication assigned tabular matter published
regularly in allotted space directly under stock or
approximately stock heads or captions: Become throughly
versed in exact requirements of tables handles, both as to
content and style or composition, and thoroughly familiar
with the sources from which tabular material is received or
obtained; receive the material, or take the initiative to obtain
it, by mail, wire or telephone, and, as required, by personal
coverage of information sources; determine from memory and
experience the probable accuracy of the data, correct apparent
errors and compile the material to meet requirements of form
and style; observe and call attention to such news
developments as the material may disclose; maintain good
relationships with information sources.
Tabular Reading - Edit accurately and rapidly assigned
tabular copy for immediate publication: Determine from
memory and experience the probable accuracy of the copy
and correct apparent errors; know requirements of style and
form for tabular material and in conformance thereto mark
copy for composing room; re-check for errors, in proofs and
in the paper (except that the proofroom remains primarily
responsible for correction of typographical errors).
Sub-Departments - Assist with news details in a bureau,
section, sub-department or office by performing all or nearly
all of the following functions: Compile tabular matter, edit
tabular copy, write news notes as set forth in foregoing
descriptions; know news sources in the field covered by the
particular office or sub-department in which the work is
performed, keep abreast of the news in the field and suggest
news ideas; read releases, answer telephone calls, interview
visitors, dispose of such as clearly do not merit attention of
reporters or editor in charge and process the remainder in
several ways, such as forwarding them for attention,
rendering an oral report with suggestions for possible

treatment and submitting written memoranda for possible use
or development as news; refer to morgue clippings, make
inquiries and use standard reference books to obtain specified
information for use in news matter and to verify or correct
specified parts of news matter; obtain pictures from diverse
outside and Times files; procure documents of news value, as
required; make prescribed calculations such as indexes and
averages, as required for publication.
Perform all work of news clerk. Perform related work as assigned.

NATURE OF THIS PROCEEDING
The Guild and the Company have a long history of arbitrating disputes about the
reclassification (reslotting) of unit positions. Arbitration awards were submitted in this
case dating back to the 1970s and 1980s, which in turn refer to yet other awards. Certain
principles applicable to reclassification requests emerge from these earlier arbitration
awards which are relevant to the dispute before me.
A reclassification arbitration is most nearly an interest arbitration, not a rights
dispute. There is not any contract provision claimed to have been violated in a
reclassification dispute between these parties. The arbitrator's function is more quasilegislative, than quasi-judicial. Because the proceeding is in the nature of an interest
arbitration, arbitrators have not insisted upon the satisfaction of any particular burden of
proof usually required in a rights dispute. This is not to suggest, however, that an
upgrade can be awarded in an evidentiary vacuum. Even an interest dispute is resolved
through examination of relevant standards upon a factual record.

The arbitration awards rendered in these parties' reclassification disputes reflect
the nature of their compensation system. The Guild and the Company have agreed to pay
unit employees according to the group into which their positions have been slotted by
agreement. The slotting is done by a Joint Evaluation Committee that compares the
duties and responsibilities of the positions with a view toward the worth of the positions
in relation to one another. This is clear both from the prior arbitration awards and Article
III, Section 8 itself. However, given the similarities in duties and responsibilities across
wage groups, comparisons of duties and responsibilities among the employees seeking the
reclassification with those who are in higher or lower wage groups are not always
dispositive of an upgrade request.
The skills, duties and other characteristics within these parties' wage groups are
not unique to one group. Employees in different wage groups regularly or occasionally
do some of the same or substantially similar work. Therefore, the performance of a task
or tasks within a higher wage group by an employee within a lower wage group does not,
by itself, warrant an upgrade.
As both the wage groups and the position descriptions have been negotiated by the
parties, the arbitrators who have considered the prior classification disputes between
these parties have usually required evidence of some substantial change in duties
effecting a significant change in responsibilities before a title is removed from its

assigned wage group and reslotted or reclassified into a higher one.4
In evaluating a request for an upgrade of a slotted position, arbitrators attempt to
ascertain whether qualitative changes in a job since it was last slotted have added enough
extra value to the job to warrant an upgrade. If so, then the level of the upgrade is
determined by a comparison of the central functions, characteristics, skills, duties and
responsibilities of the position at issue with those in other wage groups. But among the
many attributes of a given classification, not all have been or need be weighed equally.
For example, these parties do not slot jobs at the level of the highest skill or responsibility
required in the job without regard to the amount of time spent in the performance of those
higher level skills or responsibilities. The greater the frequency of use of an attribute of
the job, the greater the weight that attribute is given in the overall evaluation of that job.
It is in this context that the parties have submitted their evidence and have
advanced their arguments and it is in that same context that my award issues.
CONTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES
The Guild
The Guild argues that the five News Assistants in issue should be reclassified to
Group 10 and paid at the contractual wage rate for that group from April 19, 1994 when
the 60-Day list was submitted. If an upward reclassification to Group 10 is not
appropriate, the Guild argues that I should determine whether a reclassification to Group

4Except

when and as necessary to correct an obvious wage inequity among positions
which had once been similarly classified (e.g., Seitz award 1972).

9 or 8 is appropriate. If restarting of the News Assistant position to a higher wage group
is not found appropriate, the Guild submits that I may, nonetheless, move one or more of
the five employees, as appropriate, into the next higher wage group without actually
upgrading the News Assistant position itself. If both position ^classification and
individual assignment to higher classification are rejected, the Guild argues that I should
order the parties to meet to discuss a new wage rate for the News Assistants pursuant to
Article DC of the contract and that I retain jurisdiction to resolve any dispute over higher
classification pay.
The Guild's arguments in support of its ^classification request are based upon an
alleged evolution of the News Assistant position since 1948, an evolution that has
required the agateers to assume more duties and to take on additional responsibilities
without the aid of any close supervision by Layout Editors and Makeup Editors. The job
of the News Assistants in the Sports Department, according to the Guild, has changed
dramatically over time because of advances in newsroom technology, an expansion in the
Sports Department in the 1990's, and the Company's insistence that the agateers produce
fast, accurate, high-volume sports information. From the Guild's perspective, the News
Assistants' work now often involves the preparation and editing of text, not just statistics
printed in tabular form, the latter being what was envisioned when the job was slotted
into Group 7 by agreement decades earlier. According to the Guild, the News Assistants
are now more accurately described as "Agate Editors" who, like other editors, have
duties requiring "reportorial initiative and writing competence" with accompanying
10

independence, discretion, and responsibilities. The Guild agues that the employees in
issue are no longer "assistants." Rather, they are now required to do substantial amounts
of reporting, copyreading, rewriting, formatting and copy editing on their own as the first,
last and only eyes and hands on the material they prepare. According to the Guild, the
three column restriction on these tasks is exceeded regularly and "exponentially"
One of the News Assistants prepares the television, radio and local events listings
for the agate sports pages. The Guild argues that this position is properly classified
within Group 10, in part, because the incumbent is doing writing that a Group 10
reporter had been assigned to do at an earlier time. Beyond this, the Guild argues that
this News Assistant, like the others, works independently and without supervision or
review and routinely exercises judgment and discretion in her work.
The Company
The Company argues that the News Assistants are properly classified within
Group 7 because the agateers' job is not new or changed. From the Company's
perspective, a reclassification of the News Assistants from Group 7 to any higher wage
group must be denied because there is no evidence, or at least insufficient evidence, to
warrant a reclassification. The Company argues that the duties and responsibilities upon
which the Guild relies for an upgrade are encompassed within the very broad and
consensual job description for the position and have been required of and performed by
the News Assistants for years prior to the filing of the 60- Day list. Therefore, there is no
basis for a reslotting of the position to any higher wage group. To whatever extent the
11

News Assistants' current duties may lie outside the four corners of their job description,
the Company argues that those duties still do not support a reclassification because their
duties are unlike those of Group 10 personnel and there is no basis in the record for a
comparison with Group 8 or 9 personnel. The Company suggests that classification
"claim slips" for out-of-title pay under Article EX should have been filed if the Guild and
the News Assistants truly believed that the Company was frequently exceeding the
contractual limitations on higher classification work. The failure to do so, in the
Company's view, strongly evidences that the reclassification request lacks merit. The
Company further argues that the Guild's request for any alternative relief or remedy is not
properly before me and lacks evidentiary support in any event.
OPINION
A. RECLASSIFICATION TO GROUP 10
The Guild's request for a reclassification of the News Assistants from Group 7 to
Group 10 is denied. As explained hereafter, at least most of the duties and
responsibilities the Guild relies upon to support its reclassification request are already
encompassed within the News Assistants' long existing and broad job description. That
description encompasses in the main any evolution in the News Assistants' job that has
occurred over time. To whatever extent, if any, the News Assistants' duties or
responsibilities fall outside the scope of their position description, those duties and
responsibilities are not comparable to those required of and imposed upon the employees
in the Group 10 classifications which were submitted for my review and comparison.
12

The essence of the job of a News Assistant working on agate in the Sports
Department is unchanged in material respect since the creation of that position. Now, as
before, the basic job of the four News Assistants in issue is to obtain mostly statistical
sports information, usually from a wire service, and prepare that information for
publication in tabular form in the newspaper within available space as determined by
editors.
Through its principal witness Vincent Mallozzi, the Guild asserts the following
changes in duties and responsibilities:
1. editing non-tabular material;
2. giving editorial input;
3. trimming and formatting tabular material;
4. closing the agate pages in the composing room;
5. reporting, rewriting and copyreading in excess of the limitations on the
performance of those functions as specified in the job description.
In support of these claims, the Guild submitted approximately 80 copies of agate
page proofs marked in different colors to identify discrete functions corresponding to
those listed above. I have reviewed and considered those proofs and the testimony
related to those exhibits in the summary discussion that follows.
1. Editing non-tabular material
The Guild argues that the News Assistants now regularly read textual material,
such as injury and transaction reports, not just tabular copy. The injury and transaction
13

reports are provided by the AP wire service along with the statistical information it
provides to the Company for a fee. Although this textual information is not presented in
strictly columnar format, that text is, as the Company argues, clearly more analogous to
tabular or statistical information than any treatment of a subject in a story which an editor
might edit. There is little, if any, editing to be done on these reports which are admittedly
accurate when issued. Moreover, the editing functions performed on these reports, or on
the "filler" text the agateers prepare from time to time, are within their existing job
description. The News Assistants simply read this limited textual material for "probable
accuracy" and check for and correct "apparent errors," just as they do with the statistical
information. This is a task which is also admittedly within the expected job duties of a
Group 7 News Assistant. The editing of this type of textual material is simply not the
equivalent of the copyreading or other work required of an editor as described on the
record at some length by the Company's witnesses. Even were it copyreading in some
loose sense, this type of copyreading falls within the Group 7 job description and the
limits specified in the job description have not been shown to my satisfaction to have
been exceeded, at least not to an extent to warrant an upgrade of the position to Group
10.
The Guild's remaining arguments under this subparagraph are more directed to
added responsibilities than duties because the editing is allegedly done without
supervision and in other than an "assistant" capacity. These arguments are, therefore,
addressed later in my opinion.
14

2. Editorial input.
A News Assistant is required by the current job description to "suggest news
ideas" and to keep "abreast of the news in the field," a requirement that includes updates
on developments in the sports world.
Although News Assistants may, and occasionally have, offered verbal suggestions
to members of the editorial staff about the choice of sporting events to be reported, that
is a task which is within their existing job description. This input is not reasonably similar
to the editorial decisions made by persons in Group 10, and being a function within the
existing position description, is not a ground for reclassification.
3. Trimming and Formatting
The record establishes that the News Assistants "trim" tabular material to fit into
allotted space under the "dummy sheet" that is prepared by the Layout Editor.3 I find that
the need and opportunity for trimming is limited and that the standards for that trimming
have been pre-established by editors and are clear. The trimming task is not new, it is by
nature relatively routine, and requires little discretion or independent judgment. Rather,
the skill brought to bear in trimming sports agate information is a general knowledge of
sports and reader preferences, which the agateers admittedly have and are expected to
have. That others in higher classifications once did this work does not establish that
trimming agate sports information lies outside the Group 7 job description and certainly

5The

estimates as to the amount of time spent in trimming varied substantially among the

witnesses.
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not to a degree sufficient to warrant an upgrade to Group 10.
Formatting, according to Guild witness Mallozzi, involves "[sjetting the type to fit
the space and design on a page" in an aesthetically pleasing arrangement. To this extent,
and as Mallozzi himself admitted, formatting falls within the "Compiling" part of the
News Assistant's job description requiring the employee to "gather and prepare" the
tabular material for publication in the allotted space in the newspaper.
The Guild argues, however, that "painting" the rules and boxes within which the
sports information appears, tab-stopping6 and legging-over7 is work of a higher
classification. For several reasons, however, this work is not a basis for reclassification
to Group 10. The "painting," tab-stopping and legging-over processes require minimal
time and effort as these processes are now controlled in the main by simple computer
keystrokes. As to the tasks of tab-stopping and legging-over, the Guild's claim is also
premised upon the fact that Group 10 editors once did tab-stopping and members of the
ITU previously did legging-over. But again, that others outside of Group 7 did or now do
those tasks does not, by itself, establish a reasonable basis for a reslotting to Group 10
because of the widespread overlapping in functions across wage groups.

6Tab-stopping

is a process by which printed material is separated vertically into paragraphs
or otherwise divided into vertical groupings.
7Legging-over

is a process by which material is lined up horizontally (side by side) across

a page.
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4. Closing the agate pages
This can not reasonably be considered a new task because what the agateers
actually do in preparing the agate pages before they are sent to the composing room is
unchanged. Rather, this aspect of the Guild's request for reclassification is grounded
upon an allegation that the News Assistants are the "first, last and only hands and eyes"
on the agate material before publication because editors are allegedly no longer closing
the pages. As this is also an argument based on added responsibility, it, too, is discussed
later in my opinion.
5. Reporting. Rewriting and Copyreading
This aspect of the Guild's reclassification must fail because the record does not
establish that any work performed lies outside the existing job description for Group 7.
Assuming it may, the record does not establish that contractual restrictions on the
performance of certain of those tasks have been exceeded to an extent warranting or
requiring an upgrade to Group 10.
The reporting functions of the News Assistants reasonably fall within both the
"Compiling" and "Sub-Departments" sections of the News Assistant job description. As
therein described, the News Assistants have always been required to "take initiative to
obtain...information" from a variety of sources including "telephone calls" "inquiries"
and "interviews." News Assistants write news notes, read releases, conduct interviews
and use standard reference books in their work. That is the type of reporting the agateers
have done and still do. The record does not establish that the required reporting is
17

anything more than that addressed in the job description. Simply put, the type of
reporting done by the agateers is that incidental to tasks plainly within their job
description.
Included by the Guild as a type of reporting is the occasional preparation of
"filler," which is textual material used to fill space when the tabular material does not
occupy all of the space allotted by editors. Preparation of this type of "filler," whether in
advance and stocked for future use, or prepared fresh on an "as needed" basis, falls
within the News Assistants' existing duty to "write news notes." Even if it did not, the
work required to produce the filler has not been shown to exceed contractual limits.
The "rewriting" work is not a basis for reclassification to Group 10 because the
"rewriting" consists of little more than making changes in wording to conform to the
Company's required style. That work is within the range of "editing" and "fixing" long
required and performed by News Assistants.
The reclassification request fares no better when the job descriptions of the Group
10 positions which were introduced into evidence are examined. In support of its
upgrade request, the Guild submitted the job descriptions of five Group 10 positions:
Times Index Copy Editor, Reportorial Rewrite Man, Graphics Deskperson, Times News
Service Deskman and Reporter. These were the ones the Guild considered to be most
relevant and I have reviewed all of these job descriptions. From that review, I am
persuaded that the job of these News Assistants, even when the attributes of that job are
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viewed most favorably to the Guild, is not comparable to the jobs in Wage Group 10.8
Although certain of the duties in the Group 10 job descriptions are also found in the one
for the Group 7 News Assistant - a fact common to other job descriptions - the nature of
any of the Group 10 jobs submitted for review are fundamentally different from the job of
a News Assistant. Without unnecessarily detailing the specific tasks unique to these
Group 10 positions, the incumbents in the Group 10 positions, overall, have higher
required qualifications and levels of skill, are vested with greater discretion, and are
regularly called upon to exercise independent judgment in matters of greater consequence
to the Company than the News Assistants. In short, the incumbents in Group 10 jobs
hold positions of much different responsibility and accountability than do the Group 7
News Assistants.
Howard Walsh, the Guild's Reslotting Chairman, had underlined the tasks set
forth in the Group 10 positions which were also required, in his opinion, of the Group 7
agateers. This, however, is not persuasive of a conclusion that the agateers should be
slotted in Group 10. Only a relative few of the Group 10 tasks were common to Group 7.
Again, these parties understand and have agreed that one or more of the same duties will
appear in two or more wage groups. More specifically, that both agateers and editors
"edit" in a sense does not mean that the agateers should be Group 10 employees. The
wage slottings reflect the totality of a job's duties and responsibilities, not one or two
therefore, whether these job descriptions were selected by the Guild with deliberation
and care or were, as argued by the Company, largely a last minute afterthought, is
inconsequential. The job descriptions for Group 7 and Group 10 are what they are and they are
different in material respect.
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particular tasks that might be common in a broad sense to one or more other wage groups.
It is also not possible to determine upon this record whether the tasks common to Groups
7 and 10 are major or minor aspects of those jobs.
Walsh also described the "essence" of the Guild's reasoning for its upgrade
request and, given his position, I have given that great consideration. According to
Walsh, the Guild was persuaded that a reclassification was appropriate because the
agateers over time had become the "last set of eyes" before the agate pages were sent to
the composing room. No one was allegedly checking the agateers' work and it was this
added editorial responsibility which Walsh felt warranted an upgrade.
To whatever extent Walsh's conclusion that agateers alone close pages is accurate,
and there is disagreement and inconsistent testimony on this point, the evidence shows
that it is a responsibility that has been removed by the Company from editors over time,
without new responsibilities being imposed on the agateers. From this record, the News
Assistants are doing their job just as they did before editorial review was allegedly taken
away or allowed to erode. There is no credible evidence to support a conclusion that the
agateers are being held accountable for the accuracy of the pages they may "close," as
would a Group 10 editor be held accountable for unconnected errors. If the Company
allows agate pages to be sent to the composing room without any editorial review before
the papers are released for sale or distribution to the public, or with less editorial review
than those pages had before, that does not mean that responsibility and accountability for
accuracy has been shifted to the agateers, nor does it necessarily exact any greater
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demands on the agateers, either in terms of duties or responsibilities. If a 'Vacuum" was
created, the agateers have not been required to fill it. Thus, it can not be said reasonably
that enough extra value has been added as a requirement to the job of a News Assistant
by the lack or lessening of editorial review to warrant an upgrade to Group 10. I
recognize and acknowledge, however, that "journalistic pride" certainly impels them to
deliver work that is accurate.
The Guild's argument in this respect is quite similar to the argument made in
support of a reclassification requested for Circulation Accounts Receivable Clerks.
Arbitrator George Marlin in 1974 denied that request. There, as here, the employees for
whom the reclassification was requested performed their duties in the same way with or
without review of their work by persons in higher wage groups. As in that case, the
absence of that review need not and does not in this case result in any substantial change
in responsibility or accountability or require any additional exercise of discretion or
judgment.
Arbitrator House's 1980 award is not to the contrary of Arbitrator Marlin's earlier
award. Although a reclassification of Adjustment Clerks from Group 4 to Group 5 was
ordered, the added responsibility placed on employees by the Company's elimination of
any review of their work was only one of a number of factors which combined to
persuade Arbitrator House that an upgrade was warranted. Arbitrator House's award can
not reasonably be read to mean that a reclassification is warranted simply because work
that others in a higher classification had done is taken from those employees.
21

This reasoning applies equally to the Guild's argument that a reslotting to Group
10 is appropriate because the News Assistants no longer "assist" with editing because
there is no longer anyone to assist. The types of editing they do is within the scope of
their broad job description and that description does not restrict the agateers' editing to
that done only under "supervision." To the extent the duties fall within the scope of their
job description, and consistent with that description, agateers may perform required tasks
on their own, and when they do so, it is no basis for reslotting to Group 10.
The remaining News Assistant in issue, Chambliss, works on the daily and weekly
television, radio and local sporting event listings appearing in the sports section of the
newspaper. Chambliss obtains the information from different sources through different
means, puts that information on a daily schedule and prepares a standard graphic to show
day of event and broadcast channel or station as relevant. Chambliss does not often
determine the content of the listings which are determined by the teams, leagues,
collegiate athletic conferences and the broadcast media, except for a very few local
sporting events.
The request for reclassification of this News Assistant position is based on alleged
changes in the position in 1991, when Chambliss, employed since approximately 1985,
was asked by the Company to write text to accompany the listings, a task that had been
assigned previously to one Group 10 reporter.
The record establishes that the writing associated with finalizing the listings for
publication was assigned to the Group 10 reporter to fill out his work schedule. The fact
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that a Group 10 reporter once did this work, particularly under that circumstance, does
not mean that limited writing is not also part of a News Assistant's job. Importantly, the
duties and responsibilities upon which the Guild relies to support its reclassification
request for Chambliss fall within the job description for the Group 7 News Assistant
position. As noted in the discussion regarding the four agateers, News Assistants are
required to gather and prepare information for publication and to write news notes. The
preparation of the information for publication consists of developing fairly standard
graphics within which the listing information is presented. The graphics do not differ
much from day-to-day or week-to-week. The preparation of the information for
publication, including any needed writing, requires little, if any, of the same creativity,
skill and judgment which mark the Group 10 positions. As with other News Assistants,
the Guild has not shown enough reason to reclassify the position held by Chambliss to
Wage Group 10.
B. RECLASSIFICATION OF NEWS ASSISTANT POSITION TO GRADE 9 OR 8
If reslotting to Grade 10 is denied, the Guild argues that an upward adjustment of
the News Assistant position is still warranted to either Group 9 or 8.
The Company argues that this alternative relief must be denied because there is no
evidence about any positions in Wage Group 8 or 9. Without such evidence, the
Company argues that a reclassification of the News Assistants to Group 8 or 9 would be
based on sheer guesswork.
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I agree that the Guild's alternative argument can not be granted. There simply is
not enough evidence in this record upon which to make a reasonably informed decision as
to whether a reclassification to Wage Group 8 or 9 is warranted. In the earlier awards in
which arbitrators reclassified positions to a level lower than that requested, there was an
evidentiary basis for the alternative award. That is not present here. To be clear, I am
not holding that any of the News Assistants are properly slotted in Wage Group 7, nor
that they are not properly slotted in that wage group, only that reclassification to Group
10 is not appropriate and reclassification to Group 8 or 9 lacks an evidentiary basis in this
record.
C. ASSIGNMENT OF EMPLOYEES TO A DIFFERENT WAGE GROUP
If the News Assistant position is not reclassified to a higher wage group, the Guild
argues that I should place one or more of the named employees into the next higher wage
group without ordering the position itself reclassified. That request is denied.
There is little evidence that this has ever occurred in any context. In none of the
prior arbitration awards submitted by the parties was this done nor was it suggested to be
a permissible alternative to the reclassification of a position. The one statement by Walsh
that this had occurred in the past was ambiguous, was never pursued by either party, and
can not, by itself, establish a "past practice." I can not determine from Walsh's statement
whether individuals were ordered to be moved to a higher wage group by an arbitrator or
whether the parties agreed to do that as a settlement of a classification dispute before the
dispute ever reached arbitration.
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More fundamentally, it would appear that the reclassiflcation and promotion of
individual employees are issues covered by Article IX of the parties' agreement. If
individual relief is warranted, Article IX should be the context in which it is obtained. As
next discussed, however, Article IX issues are not properly before me.
Finally, this alternative relief is denied because the record does not establish that
any individual employees appropriately belong in Wage Group 10 and the record is silent
with respect to the duties and responsibilities of persons in Wage Groups 8 and 9.
D. ARTICLE IX RELIEF
As its last alternative request, the Guild asks for an order directing the parties to
meet and discuss higher classification pay pursuant to Article IX. For the following
reasons, that request can not be granted in this proceeding.
Article IX is an out-of-classification provision. A unit employee who is "assigned
to and does the work that distinguishes a higher job classification from his or her own" is
reclassified when 50 per cent or more of the employee's regular working time is spent
that way or paid the wage rate of the higher classification when the employee spends two
or more hours per day doing the higher classification work.
By the Guild's own admission, the issues in a reslotting arbitration are materially
different from those in an out-of-title pay dispute. Article IX requires an assessment of a
particular employee's situation under several factors which trigger the reclassiflcation or
extra pay obligation and entitlement. An upward reclassification is based ordinarily on a
change in duties or responsibilities warranting reslotting of a position to a different wage
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group. Recognizing that reclassification is different from an out-of-classification dispute,
the Guild's counsel specifically stated at the hearing that I was not being asked to decide
whether one or more employees should be paid for working out of classification.
Although the Guild argues that the issue was nonetheless left "open" because it was not
revisited after a break in the hearing, I can not agree. The Guild's last statement on the
record on this point was that this arbitration was not about an out-of-classification
dispute. If the Guild wanted to refract that statement, it was incumbent upon the Guild to
do so on the record. It would be unfair and imprudent for me to attempt any
interpretation of the language in Article IX when the focus of the hearing over many days
was directed to wholly different issues.
Moreover, Article IX is not a basis for an order to meet and discuss compensation.
Article IX is a provision of the agreement that bestows specific rights on these parties.
The parties have agreed that individual employees who work out of classification are
either reclassified or paid the pay of the higher classification depending upon their
individual circumstances. If there has been a violation of Article IX by the News
Assistants working out of title for more than the specified amount of time, there is
recourse already available under the parties' existing agreement.
CONCLUSION
The record does not establish an adequate basis to upgrade the Grade 7 News
Assistants to Group 10. Any changes in the duties and responsibilities imposed upon or
assumed by the New Assistants over time, whether stemming from advances in newsroom
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technology, an expansion and/or restructuring of the Sports Department, the Company's
desire to remain competitive in sports reporting, or other reasons, are not so substantial or
significant as to warrant or require an upward reclassification to Group 10.
Upgrading of the News Assistants to Group 8 or 9 is denied because the record
does not establish a reasonable basis upon which to make a comparison of the duties and
responsibilites of the Group 7 News Assistant position with those of any positions within
Groups 8 or 9.
Assignment of one or more individual News Assistants from Group 7 to the next
higher wage group without reclassification of the position itself is denied for the same
reasons as reclassification of the position is denied and for the other reasons explained in
my opinion.
The request for "out-of-title" pay or individual classification under Article IX is
not part of the issue in this case. An order directing the parties to negotiate higher
compensation pursuant to Article IX is denied as not within the Arbitrator's jurisdiction.
AWARD
Reclassification of the News Assistant positions in issue from Wage Group 7 to
any higher wage group is denied. All other alternative requests are also denied.

Dated:

/KfrA A 7 , ^

^
Eri<z J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
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X
IN THE MATTER OF THE ARBITRATION
between
OPINION AND AWARD
LOCAL 3 I.B.E.W.

-andPARKCHESTER SOUTH CONDOMINIUM
x

The stipulated issue is:
Did

the

collective

Employer
bargaining

violate

the

agreement

by

giving some Christmas display work in
the Main Oval to non-bargaining
personnel?

unit

If not, what shall be the

remedy?
A hearing was held on January 26, 2000 at the New York
City offices of the New York State Employment
Representatives of the above-named Union

Relations Board.

and Employer appeared

and were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument
and to examine

and cross-examine witnesses.

The Arbitrator's

Oath was waived.
The

"Christmas

display

work"

referred

to

in

the

j

stipulated issue was the hanging of lights and ornaments on the
Christmas

trees and the stapling of the lights

(and wiring) to |

the other parts of the display, for Christmas, 1999.

The Union asserts that in prior years that work was
exclusively assigned to and performed by bargaining unit members
of Local 3.

And,

if any of it was performed by others, the

quantity was de minimus.

But that for the Christmas display in

1999, the foregoing work was assigned fully or substantially to
members of Local 808, IBT, and that by doing so the Employer
breached the contract by removing bargaining unit work from the
Local 3 bargaining unit.
The Union seeks an order directing that the disputed
work be prospectively assigned to Local 3 members and that those
Local

3 members

who

were deprived of

the

work

in

1999

be

compensated for the time lost in an amount equal to what was paid
the Local 808 members.
The Employer does not deny that the disputed work was
assigned to and performed by Local 808 members, either fully or
substantially,

but asserts that in past years the work was not

exclusively assigned to Local 3 members.
Employer,

employees

of

different

Rather,

contends the

classifications

and

from

different unions participated with the Local 3 electrician in
performing the work.
assignments

Additionally the Employer argues that its

for the Christmas display in 1999 were consistent

with its managerial rights under Article VIII to:
"...direct,

supervise,

plan

and

employees covered hereunder..."

control

the

..."introduce, or change or eliminate methods,
procedures, equipment or facilities..."
I find it unnecessary

to decide whether the disputed

work was performed exclusively in prior years by Local 3 members
or whether the assignments were mixed between Local 3 personnel
and other non-bargaining unit members.
Ordinarily
decide

whether,

recognized

and

by

such

a

determination

practice,

acknowledged

the
as

would

disputed
work

be

work

within

needed to
had

the

become

Local

jurisdiction under the collective bargaining agreement.

3

For, if

found to have been performed exclusively (or even overwhelmingly)
and consistently

in prior years, a work jurisdiction would have

been established which accorded jurisdiction
notwithstanding

the

fact

that

the

to Local 3.

contract

is

And,

silent

on

bargaining unit jurisdiction, I would have held, as well settled,
that contractually, albeit impliedly, the work belonged to the
Local 3 bargaining unit.
Obviously then, the foregoing would not be negated by
reference to the Management Rights Clause

(Article VIII) because

the rights of management stated therein, may not be exercised
"inconsistent with the provision of this agreement."

For if the

disputed work, by practice, had been recognized and placed within
the

jurisdictions

of

Local

3,

then

that

jurisdictional

delineation became an implied provision of the contract, and its
removal to Local 808 members would have been "inconsistent with

the provisions of (the) agreement" and hence, in violation of the
contract.
But, here there is contractually more to the Employer's
managerial
specific

rights.

contract

The

contract

provision, which

contains

a

different,

but

fits the facts of this case

and which determinatively supports the Employer's actions.
The fourth paragraph of Article XVII

(Seniority) reads

in pertinent part:
"The parties agree that the Employer in its
Management prerogatives may, in its
discretion, which shall not be abused,
interchange employees, i.e. assign or
transfer employees from one job or
classification including those covered by
this Agreement or that with the
Jn.t_ernational Brotherhood of Teamsters...Local
808, IBT..."
(emphasis added)
The foregoing is an explicit managerial right,
contractually authorized and subject to the single restriction
that it "shall not be abused."
The facts of this case fall equally within this
specific managerial right.

The Employer "interchanged" Local 3

and Local 808 IBT members.

It "assigned" Local 808 members to

work previously performed by Local 3 and transferred them

respectively from "one job to another."

And, by express

language, this right to "interchange," "assign" and "transfer"
included Local 808 IBT members in a work mix determined by the
Employer in "its discretion."
Hence, in view of this contract provision, the question
of exclusively over the disputed work is irrelevant, and need not
be determined in this case.
What remains is whether what the Employer did for
Christmas 1999 was an "abuse" of its managerial authority.
find it was not.

I

The disputed work was not of the type requiring

an electrician's license.'

There is no dispute over the ability

of Local 808 members to do the work.

In point is the evidence

regarding the shortened period of time available to mount the
display for Christmas 1999.

The Employer offered credible

testimony that the display equipment on hand, when examined for
mounting, turned out to be broken, stolen or otherwise unusable.
And that on short notice, new equipment had to be bought and a
monetary appropriation was required from the condominium board.
This, explains the Employer, shortened the time for the
preparation of the display and the scheduled "lighting ceremony,"
requiring a "crash" program of construction and display mounting.
To get it done in time, claims the Employer, required the use of
employees

like

the

808

members,

and

others

as

well

(i.e.

carpenters, painters, gardeners, etc.) to join in performing

Indeed, the electrical work attendant to the Christmas display, namely electrical connections, fuses, currents, was
performed exclusively by Local 3 members.

various duties.
Employer,

The Local 808 members were used, explains the

because

of

the

need

because the Local

3 electricians

electrical

of

aspect

the

for

additional

were fully

display

and with

personnel

occupied
other

and

with the

condominium

electrical work.
As the Union suggests, there may be room to criticize
the Employer

for not anticipating

the need

for new

equipment

earlier and for not scheduling more time between notice to the
trades to begin mounting the display and the scheduled "lighting
ceremony."
But the evidence shows that the procedural steps taken
by the Employer for the 1999 Christmas display were the same as
in prior years.

So, even if the special difficulties encountered

in 1999 either should have been anticipated or otherwise dealt
with, I cannot conclude that it rose to the level of an "abuse"
within

the meaning

intended,

and intent

I think,

is

of Article

the willful

misuse

XVIII.
of

The "abuse"

employees

under

arbitrary circumstances.
The Union argues that the foregoing contract provision
was not intended to "borrow an employee for a few hours to do
someone else's work."
between
does not

The contract language makes no distinction

short term or long-term job assignments.
include

evidence

of how

long

the hanging

ornaments and stapling of lights took place.

This record
of lights,

It may have been "a

few hours" or it may have been over and during the approximate
eight days between the purchase of the new equipment and the

lighting
enough

ceremony.
to

meet

So the assignment
the

Union's

may well have been long

interpretation,

if

such

an

interpretation is applicable.
The Undersigned,

duly designated as Arbitrator, and

having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above-named
parties, makes the following AWARD:
The Employer did not violate the
collective bargaining agreement by
giving some Christmas display work in
the Main Oval to non-bargaining unit
personnel.

Eric J. Schmertz, Arbitrator

DATED:

February 10, 2000

STATE OF NEW YORK

)

COUNTY OF NEW YORK

)

ss:

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who executed
this instrument, which is my AWARD.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION,
ADMINISTRATOR
—X
IN THE MATTER OF THE ARBITRATION
between
OPINION AND AWARD
CASE #133000033100

LOCAL 3 I.B.E.W.
-andQUEENS CABLE CONTRACTORS, INC.

The stipulated issues are:
1. Was the discharge of JOASFARIA for just cause? If not,
what shall be the remedy?
2. Was the discharge of JUNIOR J. PACHECO for just cause?
If not, what shall be the remedy?
Hearings were held on April 5th and April 17th, 2000 at which time-Messrs. Faria
and Pacheco and representatives of the above-named Union and Employer appeared. All
concerned were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine and
cross-examine witnesses. The Arbitrator's Oath was waived.
The discharge of JOAS FARIA:
Mr. Faria, hereinafter referred to as the "grievant" was discharged on March 14,
2000 for "giving false information on an accident."
On May 25, 1999, while backing his van into a parking space the grievant struck
a pedestrian at the rear of the van. An ambulance took the pedestrian to the hospital. An
Employer supervisor reported to the scene as did the police. The Vehicle Accident form,
signed by the supervisor and the grievant stated inter alia.

Tech was backing up to park his vehicle when suddenly he struck
a pedestrian who was jay walking. The backup alarm was
working fine.
As to "Unsafe Conditions or Acts" the form stated:
"Tech should have looked on both sides of the vehicle before
proceeding to back up."
As to "Corrective Action," the Form stated:
"will talk to Techs about making sure to use both rear view
mirrors at all times."1
The diagram of the accident located the van and the pedestrian just below the
West corner of 78th Street at the intersection of 62nd Avenue in Maspeth, Queens.
The attending police officer also prepared a Police Accident Report, which is
consistent with the Vehicle Accident Form. The police officer did not witness the accident.
At the time the injury to the pedestrian was reported by the grievant as a cut on
the head. The police report makes no mention of the injury.
Reviewing on both reports, the Employer took no disciplinary action against the
grievant, acknowledging that based on the information then available, no discipline was
warranted.
Several months later, after receiving a report from its insurance carrier and
additional information from two employees of the Motor Vehicle Department, the Employer
concluded that the accident resulted in severe injuries to the pedestrian; that the grievant
falsified both the extent of the injury and his driving procedures before and while backing to
the parking spot and that those falsifications constituted grounds for his termination.
More specifically, the Employer asserts that it learned that the pedestrian
suffered such severe injuries and trauma that she "almost died twice" on the way to the
hospital. And that the grievant violated Motor Vehicle laws and Employer driving instructions
'It's undisputed that the van had no rear window, being enclosed there by a metal panel.
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and training by "making a prohibited U-turn" to get to the parking spot and wrongly backed
down a one-way street much further than he stated.
The Union's position is that this was an unfortunate accident; that the grievant
did not drive improperly; that his methods of approaching the parking space were not a
proximate cause of the injury; that the subsequently obtained information by the Employer is
not probative; and that the Employer's action in discharging the grievant several months after
V
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the accident was prompted only by a partisan insurance report and probable law suit. And
though denied, if there was any negligence on the part of the grievant, it warranted at most,
progressive discipline, not discharge.
The parties need not be reminded that this is a discharge case, with the burden
on the Employer to prove the charges by clear and convincing evidence and to establish the
propriety of the ultimate penalty of discharge for the offense(s).
Here, that burden has not been met by the requisite quantity and quality of
probative evidence.
The only probative evidence bearing on the events of the accident are the
Vehicle Accident Form, the police accident Report and the information obtained by the
Employer's supervisor who visited the accident scene.
The information that surfaced several months later is self-serving and hearsay
and/or of insufficient relevance or conclusiveness to support the penalty of discharge.
First, the insurance report by the Employer's carrier was not submitted into
evidence, nor was there any testimony by any insurance employee who prepared it or who had
input in any investigation by the carrier. What was submitted into evidence was an Employer
report, purporting to repeat or recite what the insurance report stated. That document is
obviously hearsay and, in the absence of the actual insurance report, is self-serving. In short
there is no way that I can determine on a proper evidentiary basis the accuracy of the insurance

report or its objectivity. While hearsay or even self-serving matters may be received by the
arbitrator, they can be of no probative value if they represent, as here, unsubstantiated
information purporting to support of the "just cause" standard.
The Employer also relies on the testimony of two Motor Vehicle Department
employees who were working in the vicinity of the accident to support its claim that the
grievant made an illegal U-turn, backed down against the one-way street further than he said,
and that the injury to the pedestrian was more severe than the grievant acknowledged.
Diana Gonzales, a Motor Vehicle Department examiner testified that she did not
see the actual impact of the van striking the pedestrian, but went to the scene and saw the
pedestrian "lying on the ground, with blood on the right side of her head — a lot of blood." She
stated that she saw the pedestrian jaywalking and "didn't understand why the woman didn't
stop," before the accident occurred. She observed that before the accident the grievant "backed
up very slowly and cautiously." As to the alleged U-turn she stated that she didn't actually see
it, but, based on the position of the van's wheels, surmised that a U-turn had been made.
I do not find this testimony sufficiently contrary to the grievant's report to
justify a charge of falsification by the grievant. Ms. Gonzales did not see a U-turn. She only
thought it had been made. That is not probative enough. She saw the pedestrian on the ground
bleeding from the head. The grievant reported that injury. The extent of the blood does not
mean conclusively that the later, unsubstantiated insurance report was correct, or that the
grievant had lied about the pedestrian's injury.
The grievant acknowledged he backed down into the parking space. What Ms.
Gonzales saw is not materially different. At most, the difference may be in the distance of the
backing down. But, I am not persuaded that such a difference, if any, adds up to falsification.
The testimony of the other Motor Vehicle Department employee, Jose
Dominguez, is equally inconclusive and not up to the requisite standard of "clear and

convincing" evidence. He testified that he saw the grievant "backing up from the
intersection...past two houses." Again, that testimony relates only to the distance the grievant
backed up. Whether the "back up was past two houses or past one or a part of one (as the
grievant admits) the difference is not so dramatic or critical as to support a relevant claim of
falsification. In any event, traffic or driving rule violations of this type, standing alone, may be
subject to progressive discipline, but not summary discharge. Mr. Dominguez did not go to the
accident scene.
Also speculative, and not litigated in this proceeding, is whether the grievant's
acts were a proximate cause of the pedestrian's injury. 2 I need not decide that because the
grievant was not so charged. His dismissal was based solely on the charge of falsification.
Based on the foregoing analysis, I must hold that the probative record of
evidence stops with the Accident Report, the Police Report and with the Employer's
determination that no disciplinary action against the grievant was warranted. On an evidentiary
basis, considering the burden on the Employer to offer clear and convincing evidence of the
grievant's culpability, the claim of falsification by the grievant of the pedestrian's injury, of
what he reported to supervision and in the Vehicle Accident Form, of what he told the police
and how he maneuvered the van, has not been established.
Accordingly, the Employer's initial conclusion that no discipline was warranted
remains determinative.

The Discharge of JUNIOR J. PACHECO
While driving an Employer vehicle, Mr. Pacheco (hereinafter referred to as the
'grievant") struck a 91-year old pedestrian upon or after turning on to Fifth Avenue from 79th

based on the facts in the record, it appears that the pedestrian was negligent or at least
contributorily negligent.

Street.
The Employer discharged the grievant for "reckless driving." It asserts that
based on an extensive training program, including instruction manuals, the grievant violated
specific instructions to "drive carefully" and "to observe the road ahead 1 to 1 Vi blocks and to
be alert to hazards."
The grievant's defense is that as he turned the corner the "sun blinded him" and
that he ran into the pedestrian crossing the street.
The grievant states that the pedestrian was hit at the cross-walk. The Employer
claims that it happened further into Fifth Avenue, well after the turn was made. The diagram
on the Vehicle Accident Form shows the impact of the accident on or in the cross-walk at the
intersection of Fifth Avenue and 79th Street. The Police Accident Report diagram shows the
vehicle and the pedestrian about one-third of the way down Fifth Avenue.
The trouble with the Employer's case is that it equates a pedestrian accident
unconditionally With "reckless driving." That means that employees driving Employer's
vehicles are "absolute insurers" against accidents involving pedestrians. In the instant case
there is no evidence that the grievant was speeding or driving erratically or negligently. There
is not evidence that he made a wrongful turn. There is no evidence that the pedestrian did not
emerge from an unseen location jaywalking, thereby contributing to the accident. There is no
evidence contradicting the grievant's explanation of sun blindness. Upon experiencing sun
•*. .

blindness, a driver should stop immediately. But there is no evidence here that he did not stop
when sun blinded or that striking the pedestrian did not take place simultaneously. In short, the
record is devoid of evidence detailing the accident or of the grievant's fault. Even the location
of the accident is disputed inconclusively by the two accident reports. If that was material, the
Employer should have offered supporting testimony. Remaining unproven is the matter of the
grievant's fault.

The dictionary definition of "reckless" is:
"utterly unconcerned abut the consequences of some
action;" "rash," "heedless" (Random House Dictionary).
In short, I believe that "recklessness" is more than ordinary negligence, but
rather a wanton disregard of caution. In the absence of refutation or other implicating
testimony, I cannot conclude that the grievant's explanation is either untrue or implausible or
that under the facts presented he was "heedless."
Again, it appears to me that the Employer's case is based on the theory of
"absolute liability," that each driver is an "absolute insurer "of zero accidents involving
pedestrians. Or that if a pedestrian is struck the driver's fault is per se.3 Neither in this
collective bargaining agreement nor in arbitration law generally is such a rule the standard of
just cause in cases of vehicular accidents. It is not res ipsa loquitor.
I do not see as a matter before me the question of whether the grievant was
ordinarily negligent, a circumstance less than "recklessness."
Finally, let me make it clear that accidents for which the driver is at fault may be
dealt with disciplinarily either progressively or similarly depending on the magnitude of fault.
But fault must be shown, and the particular offense charged must be clearly and convincingly
proven. The Employer has not done so in this case.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator, and having duly heard the
proofs and allegations of the above-named parties, makes the following AWARD:
The discharges of JO AS FARIA and JUNIOR J. PACHECO
were not for just cause.

Sadly, the pedestrian died, apparently of the injuries, sometime after the grievant's discharge.
But his death is not probative evidence of the grievant's "recklessness."

3
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They shall be reinstated with back pay and otherwise made whole
for the periods of time lost.

Eric J. Stfnmertz, Arbitrator

DATED: May 9, 2000
STATE OF NEW YORK

)
ss:
COUNTY OF NEW YORK )
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as Arbitrator that I am the
individual described in and who executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

NEW YORK STATE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS
BOARD, ADMINISTRATOR
-X

IN THE MATTER OF THE ARBITRATION
between
OPINION AND AWARD
LOCAL 813 I.B.T.
Case No. MP-20179
-and-

SPRINT RECYCLING

-X

The stipulated issue is:
Was
there
just
cause
for
the
discharge of ZUDI PAPRANIKU? If not,
what shall be the remedy?
A hearing was held on July 31, 2000 at which time Mr.
Papraniku,

hereinafter

representatives
All

concerned

and argument

referred

to

as

the

"grievant"

and

of the above-named Union and Company appeared.
were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence

and to examine and cross-examine

Arbitrator's Oath was waived.

The parties

witnesses.

The

filed post-hearing

briefs.
The grievant, a driver of a compactor truck, employed
since

September

1997,

is

charged

with

four

incidents

of

carelessness, resulting in accidents over a six month period in
1999, which

(especially the last incident) required the Company

to make costly repairs or pay damages.
For

the

four

cumulative

discharged in December 19.99.

incidents

the

grievant

was

The incidents charged are:
(a)

The grievant's failure to disconnect the
hydraulic lines when picking up a selfcontained

compactor

unit

in

June

14,

1999.
(b)

The grievant tore an electrical cable,
which

operated

a

customer's

gate

when

picking up or dropping off a container
at the customers loading dock, on June
25th.
(c)

The grievant's truck hit two parked cars
while backing down Williams Street.

In

backing down a one way street one wheel
of his truck was on the sidewalk

with

the other on the road.
(d)

On

the

driving,
truck.

night
the

of

December

grievant

14th,

while

a

parked

hit

It occurred when

he

took

his

eyes off the road to pick up a radio he
dropped on the floor of his truck.
Incident

(d)

resulted

in

$18,000

damage

to

the

grievant's truck, plus $4,372.50 in rental expense to the Company
of another truck while the damaged truck was being repaired.

Incident

(c) caused damage to one of the parked cars

in the amount of $2,682.
There is no record of the cost of repairs of incidents
(a) and

(b) except that one or both were repaired by Company

personnel.
Following incidents
the

grievant

about

the

(a) and

incident

(b) , the Company spoke to

and

advised

him

to be more

careful and warned him that future carelessness would result in
his discharge.
This admonition was

confirmed

in a letter

from the

Company to the Union, with a copy to the grievant.
The

evidence,

including

the

grievant's

admissions,

clearly establishes the grievant's responsibility for incidents
(a), (c) and (d). Persuasive circumstantial evidence

sufficiently

establishes his responsibility for incident (b).
I
significant

am
part

forgetfulness.

satisfied
at

least

that
to

these
the

incidents

grievant's

were

due

in

carelessness

or

I include the Williams Street account.

Though

the street is narrow and congested, the backing down against the
direction of a one way street and a collision with a parked car
is a chargeable offense under traditional motor vehicle laws and
standards, and is not, in my view, an expected or excusable work
related hazard.

Therefore, it is manifest that the four incidents of
this nature

justify

a disciplinary

penalty.

The

question is

whether the ultimate penalty of discharge was proper or whether
the Company should have applied the full sequence of progressive
discipline steps, before imposing termination.

I conclude, under

the particular circumstances of this case, that it should have
done

the

latter,

more

particularly,

imposed

a

disciplinary

suspension on the grievant, before firing him.
I

accept

the

Company's

argument

that

employees have had chargeable accidents, resulting

though

other

in monetary

liability, none committed four offenses within the short period
of six months.
excused

from

So, I do not find that the grievant should be
any

penalty

because

other

employees

who

were

responsible for an accident(s) are still employed.
Yet, I am not persuaded that the nature and magnitude
of

the

grievant's

failures,

singly

or

cumulatively

were

so

serious as to justify summary dismissal without an intervening
suspension.
I do not quarrel with any conclusion that the grievant
may be "accident-prone" or even possibly chronically unable to
take the care required in his job.

But, I conclude that in the

absence of the imposition of traditional and full progressive
discipline, his conduct, albeit unsatisfactory, had not reached
the level of incorrigibility warranting his discharge.

The

purposes and utility of progressive discipline should have been
brought to bear.
I am sure the parties know the reasons why progressive
discipline is so universally applicable in industrial relations,
where the offense(s) fall, short of grounds for summary discharge.
In that circumstance the offending employee is entitled to clear
and unequivocal notice that the conduct is unacceptable and if
continued will result in discharge.
case) do not meet that test.

Mere warnings

(as in this

And that is why a disciplinary

suspension is built into the progressive discipline sequence.
suspension

tells

the

employee,

by

dramatically

removing

A
him

temporarily from work and by depriving him of pay for a period of
time, that his conduct is not only unacceptable but that the next
step

is discharge.

In that

respect

disciplinary and rehabilitative.

the

suspension

is both

At the same time, it "hits" the

employee where he will feel it -- in the "pocketbook" and accords
him owe final chance to improve.

This dual purpose is deeply

imbedded in the disciplinary procedures of American
relations.

industrial

I conclude it is both applicable and the appropriate

remedy in this case.

Indeed, the Company began the process with

its warning letter of June 30th.

I appreciate its frustrations

when the subsequent incident(s) occurred.

But at that point, in

the

and

absence

December

of

event,

more
a

serious

accidents,

disciplinary

imposed on the grievant.

suspension

even

before

the

should

have

been

Had the Company done so, the

progressive discipline process would have been satisfied, and I
would have upheld the next step -- discharge -- following the
December accident.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator, and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above-named
parties, makes the following AWARD:
The discharge of ZUDI PAPRANIKU is
reduced to a disciplinary suspension.
He shall be reinstated but without
back pay.
The period from his discharge to his
reinstatement shall be deemed a
disciplinary suspension within the
traditional progressive discipline
sequence. Therefore, further
offenses by the grievant will
constitute just cause for his
discharge.

Eric J. Schmertz, Arbitrator

DATED:

August 25, 2000

STATE OF NEW YORK

)

COUNTY OF NEW YORK

)

ss:

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who executed
this instrument, which is my AWARD.

Pace University Libraries

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION,
ADMINISTRATOR
-X
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RESERVE

IN THE MATTER OF THE ARBITRATION
between

OPINION AND AWARD
NEWSPAPER GUILD OF NEW YORK, LOCAL 3
Case #133000105199
-and-

TIME WARNER, INC.

The stipulated issue is:
Whether the Employer violated Article
XV Sections 1, 4 and 6 of the
collective bargaining agreement when
it unilaterally
implemented a new
travel and expense policy?
If so,
what shall be the remedy?
A hearing was held on February 4, 2000 at which time
representatives of the above-named Union and Employer appeared.
All

concerned

were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence

and argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.

The

Arbitrator's Oath was waived.
Though the travel and expense policy referred to in the
stipulated issue is apparently applicable corporate-wide, it is
its implementation at the magazines published by the above-named
Employer

(i.e. Time, People, Fortune,

Life,

etc.) and

for the

Union members at those magazines, that is involved'in this case.
Article

XV,

Sections

1, 4 and

6 of

the collective

bargaining agreement reads:
Section 1.
The Publisher shall furnish the
working supplies and equipment, which the

Publisher
shall deem necessary
for
Employee to use in the service of
Publisher.

the
the

Section 4.
The Publisher shall pay all
expenses, which shall be authorized by the
Publisher and necessarily incurred by any
Employee in the course of assigned duties.
Section
6.
The
amount
of
the
meal
reimbursement
for out-of-town
assignments
shall be up to $12.00 for breakfast, $14.00
for lunch and $24.00 for dinner.
It

is

the

Union's

position

Employer's unilaterally implemented

"T&E

generally
Policy"

that

the

substantially

changed the entitlements of bargaining unit employees under the
foregoing contract provisions, constituting violations thereof.
More specifically, the matters and changes complained
of by the Union are:
1.

The Employer now

requires receipts for

meals and will reimburse only the actual
amount spent, but no more than $12 per
breakfast,

$14

for

lunch

and

$24

for

of

the

T&E

dinner.
Until

the

implementation

Policy on or about February 1, 1999, the
practice

for

many

years

was

for

the

Employer to reimburse employees a flat
total

sum

breakfast,

of
$14

$50
for

(i.e.
lunch

and

$12
$24

for
for

dinner) regardless of the actual amount

spent

for those meals, and no receipts

were required.
The change asserts

the Union,

violates

Section 6 of Article XV.
2.

Whereas for many years prior to February
1,

1999 and particularly

reporting

on

culture,"

the

employees

for

events

for employees
of

"popular

Employer
newspaper

reimbursed
subscriptions,

movie and theatre tickets, compact music
discs,

and

cable

longer does so.
no

longer

television.

It

no

And for them or others,

reimburses

for

cell

phone

activation or replacement, internet and
computer
These
within
asserts

expenses,

changes
the
the

and

(and

rule

presumably

of

Union

babysitting.

ejusdem

violates

others
generis)

Sections

I

and 2 of Article XV.
3.

For foreign correspondent, Ed J. Barnes,
who undisputedly

needs

$10,000

in cash

to cover expenses when he is assigned to
"cover

a

procedures

war,"
required

the
under

bureaucratic
the

new

T&E

Policy consumes about two days before he

can

get

that

cash

from

the

Employer,

thereby delaying by that amount of time
his

departure

to

the

war

zone.

Previously, before the implementation of
the T&E Policy, he could get the cash in
a matter of hours
submission

of

(or less)
a

with

simple,

the

single

requisition.
The delays resulting from the new Policy
have led him to maintain $10,000 in his
own

funds

so

that

that

delay

can

be

avoided and he can leave immediately to
cover such a critical and time sensitive
assignment as a war, with reimbursement
for

the

use

of

his

own

funds

to

be

realized later.
This asserts

the Union is violative of

Sections 1 and 4 of Article XV.

can

get

that

cash

from

the

Employer,

thereby delaying by that amount of time
his

departure

to

the

war

zone.

Previously, before the implementation of
the T&E Policy, he could get the cash in
a matter

of hours

submission

of

(or less)
a

with

simple,

the

single

requisition.
The delays resulting from the new Policy
have led him to maintain $10,000 in his
own

funds

so

that

that

delay

can

be

avoided and he can leave immediately to
cover such a critical and time sensitive
assignment as a war, with

reimbursement

for

funds

the

use

of

his

own

to

be

is violative

of

realized later.
This asserts the Union
_

Sections 1 and 4 of Article XV.
Unquestionably,

reliance

the

on past practice.

thrust

of

It argues

the

Union's

that the

case

is

longstanding,

apparently unvaried practices referred to above, and in effect
prior

to

February

unconditional

1,

1999,

provide

meaning,

definition

and

interpretation of Article XV Sections 1, 4 and 6.

And that the changes in those practices, effectuated by the new
T&E Policy, constitute contract changes requiring bilateral

bargaining.

And

to

allow

the

Employer

to

make

changes

unilaterally is to accord to the Employer an unrestricted right
to

eliminate

all

the benefits and entitlements

envisioned

in

Article XV.
Properly, the Union does not challenge the Employer's
managerial right to legislate a Travel and Expense Policy per se.
Indeed such a policy is in the nature of work rules, which are
prerogatories

of

management,

so

long

as

they

are

in

implementation of contractual conditions of employment and not in
conflict with those conditions.

Here, the challenge is to the

application and implementation of certain parts of the T&E Policy
as stated above, which the Union claims are in conflict with the
contractual rights of the employees under Article XV.
The

Employer

interprets

the

disputed

Sections

as

specifically preserving its unilateral authority to decide which
expenses it will allow for reimbursement and, in the case of the
meal allowance, the amount of reimbursement and the conditions to
qualify for reimbursement.
the

Sections

authority.

in

support

It points to the explicit wording of
of

the

retention

of

its

unilateral

It notes that Section 1 refers to "working supplies

and equipment which the Publisher shall deem necessary..." (emphasis
added).
That

Section

4 refers

to

"expenses

authorized by the Publisher..." (emphasis added).

which

shall

be

And that Section

6 does not guarantee $50 for the three meals but provides for

reimbursement

"up to" the individual amounts specified.

Or in

other words, those amounts are neither guarantees nor minimums,
but rather the maximum amount allowable, subject to verification.
And that in furtherance of an inherent managerial right to audit
expenses

(for financial control and tax purposes),

it has the

right to require receipts.
With regard to the items referred to in #2 above, the
Employer

asserts

reimbursements
its contractual

that

the

grant,

denial

or

charge

in

of and for those items is simply an exercise of
right to "authorize" or to determine which, if

any are "necessary."

With the contractual reservation of that

authority, the Employer contends

that it may make the type of

unilateral changes which it made with the implementation of the
T&E Policy on February 1, 1999.
The

Employer

points

out

that

historically

it

promulgated earlier and different T&E Policies in 1994, and 1995,
with

attendant

changes

in

the

eligibility

or

methodology

of

providing "supplies and equipment" and reimbursing for expenses,
without challenge or grievances from the Union.
With regard to the particular complaint of Mr. Barnes,
the Employer points out that it did not and will not deny him the
$10,000

cash advance to cover a war assignment.

involved,

All that is

explains the Employer is a change in the method of

obtaining the advance, and that if it means that Barnes cannot

get to his assignment as soon as he wishes, that is an
"administrative
responsible.

foul up"

for which in no way

is Barnes held

The Employer also notes that the T&E Policy makes

provision for the resolution of this problem by providing for an
"authorization

list"

Employer suggests
situated)

would

for pre-approval

that Barnes

of

cash

advances.

(and presumably others

qualify for that

The

similarly

list,

thereby

restoring the

three

well-settled

virtual immediacy of a cash advance.
In my
rules,

view,

there

are

which apply to this case.

reason."

arbitral

The first is the "rule of

I apply that to the Barnes complaint.

I agree with the

Union and Barnes that it is professionally wrong as contrary to
responsible journalistic standards, for a war correspondent to be
delayed

covering

a war

assignment.

I believe

the

Employer

recognizes this when he acknowledged the Barnes situation as an
"administrative foul up."
with

an

acute

sense

Barnes is a renowned war correspondent
of

professional

responsibility

and

journalistic pride.

He should get his $10,000 cash advance as

quickly as before.

Applying a "rule of reason," he should be

placed forthwith on the "authorization list" for pre-approval of
the requisite cash advance, and my Award shall so provide.
The

next

rule

relates

to

the

practice and explicit contract language.
settled

that

where

the

contract

interplay

of

past

It is universally well

language

is

clear

and

unambiguous, a contrary, long-standing past practice is preempted

by that contract language prospectively.
party

to

a

contract

may

insist

on

In other words, either

and

enforce

the

contract

language, thereby nullifying the effectiveness of past practice
at that point and for the future.
Section 6 clear and unambiguous.
the

Employer

may

enforce

reimbursement for meals.

the

Here I find the language of
So that from February 1, 1999,
contract

language

regarding

That language makes clear not that an

employee gets $12, $14 and $24 for the three meals regardless of
what he actually spent, but rather that he is entitled up to each
of those amounts.

The "up to" proviso means that the Employer

may confine reimbursement to the actual expenditure with a cap of
$12,

$14

and

distinctions

$24.

and

That

that

language

limitations, means,

contemplates

impliedly

but

those

logically,

that the Employer may set up a method of auditing the amounts
spent.

And that means, that he may require receipts. So I uphold

the Employer's new rule that only the actual amounts spent shall
be reimbursed, with the caps indicated, and that it may require
receipts in the reasonable implementation of the clear contract
language.

But, again, I apply a "rule of reasons."

Apparently

there are circumstances where the meal taken is of the type where
obtaining a receipt is impracticable - like a hot dog at a ball
game assignment, or other similar fast food meals "taken on the
fly."

Such expenditures, as the Employer concedes,

require receipts.

Department heads or supervisors

should not
should have

the discretionary authority to waive receipts in those

circumstances

and

reimburse

the

employee

for

those

types of

expenses on the employee's word and/or written request.
The third rule relates to the exercise of a reserved
managerial authority.

A managerial prerogative or reserved right

is not totally unrestricted.

It may not be exercised arbitrarily

or in an abusive manner.
Union

projected,

benefits,

Here, if the Employer did what the

namely

entitlements

the

unilateral

or reimbursements

elimination
under

of

Article

the

XV, I

would unhesitatingly identify that as an abuse of its authority
and enjoin it.
Specifically,
language
Publisher

of Sections

I

agree

1 and

with

the

Employer

4, namely the provision

that

the

that the

"shall deem the necess(ity)" of working supplies and

equipment to be furnished and shall "authorize" the "necessary"
expenses to be reimbursed constitute a retention by the Employer
of his managerial

authority over these matters.

But,

if the

items in #2 above are factually "working supplies and equipment"
"necessary" for the employee to use in his employment with the
Employer, a determination by the Employer that they are not to be
supplied or not subject to reimbursement, would be arbitrary and
an abuse of the Employer's authority.
There is simply not enough probative evidence in this
record to make a determination on the items in Paragraph 2 above.
The

principal

evidence

setting

forth

the

complaint

in

this

regard, namely the written statement of Lyndon Stambler was not

in-person testimony, nor was it subject to cross-examination
other

supporting probative

evidence.

It may be

that

or

if the

February 1, 1999 T&E Policy withdrew the previously reimbursable
items set forth therein and those benefits were necessary for the
employee's use in the service of the Employer,

a violation of

Section 1 would have occurred by an act by the Employer that was
arbitrary or an abuse.

And, of course, the opposite is equally

true.
I

cannot

judge

from

the

bare

written

Stambler

statement whether a Section I violation has taken place.

As I

see it, determinations may only be made on a case-by-case basis,
and based on probative evidence of what items an employee needs
to do his job, which if denied him or not reimbursed would be
arbitrary

and

an abuse.

I shall

reserve the

rights

of the

parties on that part of the dispute set forth in #2 above.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator, and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above-named
parties, makes the following AWARD:
1.

The Employer's T&E reimbursement policy
for meals under Section 6 of Article XV
of the contract does not, violate the
collective bargaining agreement. But
there shall be due regard to those
acknowledged circumstances where
obtaining a meal receipt is
impracticable.

2.

With regard to the complaint of Ed J.
Barnes, I find that there are
unreasonable bureaucratic impediments to
his ready receipt of a $10,000 cash
advance to cover a war assignment, but
10

not a breach of the collective
bargaining agreement. However, in the
interest of professional journalism, the
bureaucratic procedures or what the
Employer acknowledges as an
"administration foul up" shall be
remedied by placing Barnes on the
"authorization list" for pre-approval of
cash advances. This shall be done to
restore the quick availability of
requisite cash so that he may promptly
leave to cover a war assignment.
3.

With regard to the other changes set
forth in Paragraph #2 above (i.e.
newspaper subscriptions, movie and
theatre tickets, music discs, cable TV,
cell phones, computers and the internet,
babysitting, et al.), there is
insufficient evidence in the record for
determinations. The rights of the
parties are reserved for determinations
on a case by case-by-case basis.

Eric J./Schmertz, Arbitrator

DATED:

March 2, 2000

STATE OF NEW YORK
ss:
COUNTY OF NEW YORK
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who executed
this instrument, which is my AWARD.
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AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION,
ADMINISTRATOR
-X
IN THE MATTER OF THE ARBITRATION

between
OPINION AND AWARD
NEW ENGLAND HEALTH CARE EMPLOYEES
UNION 1199

-andYALE NEW HAVEN HOSPITAL

The stipulated issue is:
Did the Hospital have just cause to
terminate VICTORIA STANBERRY on March
23, 1999?

If not, what shall be the

remedy?
A hearing was held in New Haven Connecticut on January
14, 2000 at which time Ms. Stanberry, hereinafter referred to as
the "grievant" and representatives of the above-named Union and
Hospital appeared.

All concerned were afforded full opportunity

to offer evidence and argument and to examine and cross-examine
witnesses.

The parties filed post-hearing briefs.
The grievant is charged with fraudulently collecting

disability benefits under the Hospital disability plan while, at
the same time working for another employer.
The essential facts are not in dispute.

The grievant

was employed by the Hospital as a part-time cashier in its

cafeteria, twenty hours a week.
second

job

with

a

company

While so employed

named

Con-Air,

she had a

apparently

in

a

receptionist or other clerical capacity.
In September 1999 the grievant became disabled

(due to

a circumstance to be referred to later) and was unable to work
for

the

Hospital.

She

applied

for

and

received

disability

payments under the Hospital's disability plan from September 28,
1998 through January 24, 1999.

On or about that latter date the

grievant was "cleared" by her physician to return to work at the
Hospital, and did so beginning on January 25, 1999.
Subsequently

the Hospital

discovered

that during her

disability leave from October through December 1998 the grievant
worked

at

a

job with

Con-Air.

During

the

same

period

the

grievant continued to receive and accept disability payment from
the Hospital.

The Hospital discharged her on March 23, 1999.

It

is undisputed that the Hospital's disability plan contemplates an
inability

to

work

while

benefits

are

paid

and

prohibits

occupational employment during that period of time.
Based on the evidence and testimony, I conclude that
the

grievant,

at

some

point

during

the

coincidences

of

her

disability and work with Con-Air, knew that it was wrong for her
to work at the second job while drawing disability benefits from
the Hospital.
denied

the

I so conclude

employment

when

because the grievant repeatedly
questioned

by

the

Hospital

and

ultimately admitted it only when confronted with the Con-Air time

cards.

In that respect

grievant acted wrongly.

I agree with

the

Hospital

that the

And I agree generally with the argument

of the Hospital that the penalty of discharge for such an offense
should

not be "disturb(ed) simply because

differs

from

that

which

the

Arbitrator

the penalty imposed
might

have

chosen."

However that principle is subject to exception where there are
compelling

mitigating

circumstances.

And

if

so,

though

the

offense should not be excused, those mitigating factors may be
properly taken into consideration in reviewing the appropriation
and fairness of the penalty imposed.
Here,

there

are

such

compellingly

mitigating

circumstances.
The grievant's disability resulted from an assault on
her.

More specifically, as she left work at the Hospital on

September 28, 1998 she was shot, and profoundly wounded.
left

arm

was

procedures

shattered,

to repair

requiring

and remove

three

bone,

intricate

the

Her

surgical

installation of a

fixator, a cast and metal plates and an inability to use the arm
for several months.

Bullets also penetrated her hip and knee.

One bullet remains in her body.
There
disabled

is

no

the grievant

disability

was

certification.

duly

dispute
from her
certified

that

the

injuries

job at the Hospital,
by

medical

sustained
and her

evaluations

and

Specifically, she could not use her injured arm

and hence could not work as a cashier.

She was also unable at

that point to work for Con Air.
The
financial

next

mitigating circumstance

is

the

grievant' s

condition and the fact that before she was shot and

disabled, she worked two jobs (at the Hospital and at Con-Air) in
order to support
mother).

herself and her several children

This dual

employment

(as a single

was known to the Hospital.

I

believe that faced with the economic adversity of receiving only
sixty

(60%)

percent

of

her

regular

pay

from

disability

and

without a second job at that point, the grievant was in extreme
need to increase her income as she had done with the second job
before her disability.

And when contacted by Con-Air

with an

offer of a light duty assignment answering the telephone which
could be done without the use of her disabled and immobilized
left

arm,

she

accepted

the

offer.

I

think

that

it's

not

unreasonable to conclude that at that point she thought that with
her prior known employment arrangement of working two jobs, with
her

certified

being

inability

disabled,

and

to resume

her

financial

work

at the Hospital after

needs,

it

would

not

be

objectionable or improper for her to take on the job at Con-Air
that she could physically perform.

Or that

it would

not be

improperly different from when she had the dual employment before
the disability.
Of course she was wrong.

To my mind however, her mistake,

is tempered by the

unique and particular circumstances of this case-the gravity of
her disability; her history of and need to work a second job; her
doctor's orders precluding

her from returning

to the Hospital

job, and by the fortuitous offer of light duty work by her former
second employer, Con-Air.
Tempered
disciplined

does

not

mean

excused.

She

should

be

for hiding the true facts of employment at Con-Air

and by improperly accepting disability payments at the same time.
This is not a criminal case, but rather an employment
offense.
laws
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So I make no determination whatsoever on whether any
violated
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reference to the public

filed against her.

Indeed,

law, no

despite

such

the
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So the penalty that may and should be imposed

should be in the context of the employment relationship under the
collective

bargaining

agreement

and

under

the

terms

of

the

Hospital's disability plan, not under the criminal or public law.
With

that

said,

and

considering

my

conclusions

regarding the grievant's culpability and the mitigating factors I
have found to be compelling, the appropriate penalty is a lengthy
disciplinary suspension rather than discharge.

The grievant has

been discharged from the Hospital job for almost a year.
period of time, namely one year, shall be
disciplinary penalty.
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